a group of people with no law in south korea

yes, they are lawless with no censorship nor any sort of authority, working for government.  can you imagine a country with no law, and/or its people with no law?  it would be real tough and real hard to get over with public money or something of that sort.  so this is just a reminder for all who want to know and why it should take so long...

소망교회 김지철 목사님 인터넷 설교중 공부에 관한 말씀...

설교자: 김지철교수님
성경말씀: 마 4,1-11
2002/12/15(일)

 인생은 투쟁이다. 

인생은 투쟁이다.
마 4,1-11
                                                                                          김 지 철교수님 (장신대)
공자는 논어의 {위정편}에서 자기자신의 일생을 회고하면서 이렇게 말합니다.
15살에 학문에 뜻을 세우고(지학), 30살에 독립적인 인생이 되었고(이립), 40살에 불혹이고, 50살에 지천명이고, 60살에 이순이라고 했으며, 70살에 마음내키는대로해도 법도를 넘지 않았다(종심불유거)라고 말합니다. 중학교 때에 이 글을 읽으면서 나는 30살 이전에 확고한 사람이 되고 불혹의 나이(미혹됨이 없고 흔들림이 없다)도 공자보다 앞당길 수 있지 않겠는가 생각해 본적이 있었습니다. 그러나 결코 그런 것이 나의 인생은 아니었습니다. 인간적으로 공자는 나보다 훨씬 뛰어난 인물이었습니다.
그러나 성경말씀을 다시 읽어 보면서 인생이란 이렇게 단계적으로 발전하는 것만은 아니라는 점을 확인하게 됩니다. 예수님을 통하여 발견하게 되는 것은 인생이란 언제나 미혹받는 현장이며 그런 의미에서 인생이란 철저한 자기 내면적인 투쟁의 연속이라는 사실입니다. 치열한 싸움의 장이 곧 인생이라는 사실입니다.
예수님의 생을 돌아보면, 그분에게 있어서 공생애의 시작도 사탄의 유혹과 시험을 이겨나가는 투쟁으로 출발합니다. 그리고 공생애의 3년의 기간도, 더구나 겟세마네 동산에서의 기도시간도 예외가 아니었습니다. 마지막 십자가에서의 예수님의 처절한 고뇌의 부르짖음에는 하나님의 뜻을 순종하기 위한 치열한 내적 투쟁이 있었다는 사실을 알려줍니다.
이러한 투쟁의 모습은 예수님의 뒤를 따라가는 우리들에게도 마찬가지입니다. 어렸을 때도, 청년의 때도, 신학을 한다고 이 동산에 올라왔을 때에도, 그리고 교회현장에 나가서도 그러합니다. 사실 이러한 투쟁이 끝나는 날은 우리의 인생이 끝나고 하나님 앞에 서는 날입니다. 그러므로 우리는 삶을 살아나갈 때에 투쟁적으로 사는 것을 오히려 즐거워할 필요가 있습니다.
I. 하나님의 뜻을 순종하며 공적인 생애를 출발하려는 예수님께서 처음 접한 것은 사탄과의 영적 투쟁의 자리였습니다. 그것도 성령의 세례를 받으며 하나님의 사랑하는 아들이라고 칭함받은 예수님이 가야할 길이었습니다. 예수님은 성령에게 이끌림을 받아 광야로 나갔습니다. 마가복음에 의하면 성령이 주어로 나와 있습니다. 성령께서 예수를 광야로 내쫓았다(예: 귀신을 내쫓다)고 말씀합니다. 성령께서 작정하시고 예수님을 몰아갑니다. 예수님에게 있어서 성령의 경험은 그를 황홀한 천국의 자리에 이끌어 준 것이 아니라, 철저하게 땅의 자리, 외롭고 고독한 자리로 내 몬 것입니다. 그래서 예수로 하여금 홀로 있음을 경험하게 만듭니다. 삶의 고독한 자리로 나아가게 강요합니다. 이 광야에서 40일을 홀로 있게 만들었습니다. 그것도 금식하면서 말입니다. 왜 그랬을까요?
홀로 있을 줄 아는 사람만이 다른 사람과 더불어 있을 수 있기 때문입니다. 홀로 있을 때에 자기를 바르게 세울줄 아는 사람이 다른 사람들을 바로 세울 수 있기 때문입니다.
예수님에게 있어서의 홀로 있음은 특히 신앙적인 고독이라고 할 수 있습니다(창 32장: 야곱의 홀로있음). 이는 기도하는 고독입니다. 우리는 이렇게 말할 수 있습니다. 예수님의 영적인 능력은 이 고독한 시간에 하나님을 만나는 자리에서부터 나온 것이라고 말입니다.
인간은 홀로 있을 때에 무엇을 생각하고 행동하는가? 홀로 있을 때에 어떤 결정을 내릴 것인가에 따라 그 인생이 결정됩니다. 홀로 있음이란 다른 사람의 결정에 의해 자기 인생을 맡기는 것이 아니라, 자기 자신의 결정에 의해 삶을 살아가는 것임을 뜻합니다.
실제로 우리 자신의 인생 길을 정해주는 사람은 자기 자신을 제외하고는 아무도 없습니다. 나의 인생의 배를 이끌어 줄 사람은 오직 나밖에 없습니다. 바로 우리가 이 사실을 알게 될 때에 다음 두 가지 중에 어느 한 쪽을 선택하라는 요구가 우리를 향해 다가옵니다.
하나는 사탄을 통하여 오는 것입니다. 이 세상의 세속적 부와 명예와 자랑에 네 인생 모든 것을 걸라는 유혹입니다. 그것을 향해 달려가라는 강력한 유혹입니다.
다른 하나는 오직 성령을 통한 진정한 하나님의 사람이 되라는 예수님의 초청이 들려옵니다. 이 세상을 살면서 오직 하나님 만으로 만족하고 하나님을 섬기라. 그리고 성령의 능력을 덧입으라라는 요청입니다.  
구약의 이스라엘 백성에게서도 광야는 똑같은 것을 경험하게 했습니다. 그들은 광야에서 스스로가 철저한 단독자라는 사실을 깨닫습니다. 그들은 어떻게 이 광야를 보냈습니까? 모든 가능성이 단절된 곳에서 그들은 다시금 종되었던 애굽 땅을 그리워합니다. 먹고 마실 것을 불평하면서 돌아가려 합니다. 그럼에도 불구하고 그들은 앞으로 나아가야 했습니다. 하나님의 약속을 믿고 광야를 건너야 약속의 땅 가나안에 들어갈 수 있습니다. 그러기에 광야는 두가지 의미가 있습니다. 하나는 모든 삶의 여건이 단절된 불모지/ 더 이상 생의 가능성이 끊어진 황량한 곳입니다. 그러나 다른 하나는 하나님의 기적의 은총과 도움을 맛볼 수 있는 은혜의 장소라는 사실입니다.
신 8,15-16: "너를 인도하여 그 광대하고 위험한 광야 곧 불뱀과 전갈이 있고 물이 없는 건조한 땅을 지나게 하셨으며 또 너를 위하여 물을 굳은 반석에서 내셨으며 네 열조도 알지 못하던 만나를 광야에서 네게 먹이셨나니 이는 다 너를 낮추시며 너를 시험하사 마침내 네게 복을 주려 하심이었느니라."
시 78,15에서 "광야에서 반석을 쪼개시고 깊은 수원에서 나는 것 같이 저희에게 물을 흡족히 마시우셨으며"
예수님에게 있어서 광야란 어떤 곳입니까? 그분에게서도 굶주림과 헐벗음과 외로운 삶의 자리였습니다. 곧 모든 삶이 정지된 불모지의 자리였습니다. 그러나 동시에 하나님의 능력을 경험하는 자리, 오직 하나님에게만 자신을 드리는 장소였던 것입니다. 철저하게 홀로 있을 수 있는 사람이 다른 사람들과 함께 만날 수 있고, 다른 사람들과 만나면서도 외롭지 않게 됩니다. 그리고 자기의 길을 담대하게 가게 되는 것입니다. 이 광야에서 바로 예수님은 이러한 길을 갈 수 있는가를 사탄으로부터 시험을 받고 있습니다.
II. 광야에서 예수님을 향한 사탄의 유혹은 교묘할뿐만 아니라, 끈덕지다고 할 수 있습니다. 유혹이 세 번씩 반복되고 있다는 것은 그 유혹이 얼마나 철저하고 치열하게 전개되고 있음을 우리에게 알려줍니다.
1. 사탄의 유혹 방법은 어떠할까요?
   1) 예수님의 자의식을 이용합니다: "네가 하나님의 아들이거든"(3.6 절). 인간 실존의 근거와 뿌리를 뒤흔들고 있습니다. "네게 하나님의 아들의 가능성과 현실성이 있는가? 너는 혹 허울뿐인 존재는 아닌가?" 묻고 있습니다.
   2) 인간 예수의 기본적 욕망을 부추킵니다: 세상의 보통 사람들이 중요시하는 것을 알고 있느냐를 질문하고 있습니다. 인생을 살아갈 때에 실제로 먹는 것, 세상에서 출세를 하고, 뽐내고 인기를 얻는 것이 무엇보다 중요하지 않느냐고 유혹하고 있습니다. 마지막으로 하나님없이도 인생을 괜찮게 살 수 있지 않겠느냐고 묻고 있습니다. 인간의 자기 호기를 부추키고 있습니다.
2. 사탄의 유혹 내용을 구체적으로 살펴보십시다.
   1) 인간론의 왜곡입니다:
"이 돌들로 떡덩이가 되게 하라"는 유혹입니다. 먹고 마시는 것에 가장 인간적인 본질이 들어 있다는 주장입니다.
예수님은 이에 대해 "사람이 떡으로만 살 것이 아니요 하나님의 입으로부터 나오는 모든 말씀으로 살 것이라"(신 8,3)을 인용합니다. 예수님은 분명 인간에게 있어서 먹고 마시는 떡과 음료가 중요하다고 말씀하십니다. 그러나 인간은 물질 이상의 존재라는 것입니다. 인간은 물질에 의해서가 아니라 하나님의 말씀에 의해서 규정되는 거룩한 존재라는 선언입니다. 인간의 저 목마름과 배고품은 생수이시고 생명의 떡이신 하나님의 말씀을 통해서만 채워진다는 선언입니다. 그렇게 먹고 마셔도, 그렇게 돈을 벌어도, 그렇게 명예와 세상의 쾌락을 추구해도, 인간 영혼 깊은 속에 타는 목마름과 배고픔이 있다는 것입니다. 그것은 오직 하나님의 말씀만으로 충족될 수 있다는 말씀입니다.
요사이는 먹고 마시는 것뿐만 아니라, 성의 자유로운 담론화가 진행되면서 남녀간의 관계에 있어서 성적접촉을 최우선적 가치관으로 삼는 흐름이 만연되어가고 있습니다.
언젠가 조선일보에서 "사라(마광수)와 뽀리(박광수)"가 만나는 모습을 본적이 있습니다:}
하나는 대학 교수이고, 다른 하나는 만화가입니다. 전자는 성을 인간 본연의 최우선적 가치관으로, 후자는 성보다 앞서 있는 사랑과 이해를 최우선적 과제로 언급합니다. 오늘날 이 두가지의 세계관은 엄청나게 부딪치는 가치관의 충돌일른지도 모릅니다.
가정도 마찬가지입니다. 부부사이에서 성관계가 아주 중요한 것임에는 틀림이 없습니다. 그럼에도 불구하고, 성보다 더 우선적인 가치관이 있어야 합니다. 예수님은 인간에게 물질과 성이 필요없다는 것이 아니라 이를 다스릴 하나님의 말씀이야마로 인간을 인간답게 만드는 첩경이라고 말씀하신 것입니다.
  2) 세계관의 왜곡이며 동시에 신앙관의 왜곡입니다:
"네가 만일 하나님의 아들이어든 뛰어 내리라"고 말합니다. 시편의 말씀을 인용합니다. "그가 너를 위하여 그의 사자들을 명하시리니 그들이 손으로 너를 받을어 발이 돌에 부딪치지 않게 하리로다"(시 91,11-12).
그것은 바로 인기주의적 세계관을 추구하라/ 기복주의적 세계관을 가지라는 유혹입니다. 하나님에 대한 신앙을 자기 인기와 명예를 높이는 데 사용하라는 것입니다. 하나님을 믿는 것과 기도하는 것을 한번 매직으로 만들어 보라는 것입니다. 성전 꼭대기 높은 데서 뛰어내려 새처럼 사쁜히 땅에 내려 앉는 모습을 사람들에게 보여 환호를 받으라는 유혹입니다. 이는 다른 말로 하면, 사람들을 매료시키는 매직을 보여주라는 것입니다. 매직이 무엇입니까? 사람들에게 인기를 얻으려는 기적은 매직입니다. 자기의 욕망을 채우려는 기적은 매직입니다. 기독교는 기적을 존중하지만 매직을 거부합니다.
- 예수님은 인기를 위해 기적을 행하신 적이 없습니다. 예수님의 기적의 자리에는 늘 인간의 고난과 고통, 아픔이 들어 있습니다. 오병이어의 기적, 나병환자를 고칠 때, 바다의 폭풍을 잔잔히 하실 때가 모두 그러합니다. 예수님은 자기의 능력을 과시하기 위하여 기적을 행하시지 아니합니다. 예수의 기적에는 인간에 대한 사랑과 긍휼이 들어 있습니다. 바로 이것 때문에 기적과 치유를 행하시는 분이 곧 예수님이십니다.
매직을 요구하는 사탄에 대해 예수님께서 "주 너의 하나님을 시험하지 말라."(신 6,16)고 말씀하십니다. 그런데 문제는 사탄도 성경을 인용하면서 예수님을 유혹한다는 사실입니다. 신명기를 인용하는 예수님을 향해 사탄은 시편을 인용하면서 유혹합니다.
여기서 말씀과 말씀이 부딪칩니다. 어떤 것이 옳은 말씀입니까? 여기에 해석학적인 문제가 발생합니다. 예수님이 말씀하신 신명기서가 사탄이 인용한 시편보다 더 위대한 말씀이라는 뜻입니가? 결코 그렇지 않을 것입니다. 말씀이 지향하는 바가 무엇인지를 바르게 깨닫는 데 있습니다. 그런 점에서 문자주의적인 성서읽기는 위험할 수가 있습니다. 그 말씀의 본질을 해석학적으로 확인해야 하기 때문입니다. 사탄은 예수님을 유혹하기 위하여 하나님의 말씀을 문자적으로 악용합니다. 사탄의 오해는 어디에 있었습니까? 하나님을 인간을 위해 마음대로 사용할 수 있는 존재로 오해합니다. 신앙을 매직으로 저락시키는 데 있습니다. 예수님은 하나님께서 인간의 매직을 보여주기 위해 이용되는 분이 아님을 천명하십니다.
  3) 신론의 왜곡입니다:
사탄은 천한 만국과 그 영광을 보여주며, 예수님을 유혹합니다. "만일 내게 엎드려 경배하면 이 모든 것을 네게 주리라"
하나님에게 전적인 가치를 두지 말라는 요구입니다. 하나님이 정말 창조주, 역사의 주, 구원의 주인가에 대해 의문을 품게 만듭니다. 하나님 없이도 인생은 잘 살 수 있다고 가르칩니다. 사탄은 보는 것에 미쳐서 보이지 않는 세계의 위대함을 거절하는 어리석음을 지니고 있습니다. 십자가 없는 영광의 신학에 너의 삶의 기초를 세우라고 말하는 것이 바로 사탄입니다.
"사탄아 물러가라. 주 너희 하나님께 경배하고 다만 그를 섬기라"고 예수님은 말씀하십니다. 하나님만이 경배받을 분이라는 사실입니다. 이 말은 인간의 자유를 선언하는 말씀이기도 합니다. 하나님 이외의 어떤 것에에 대해서도 자유하라는 말씀입니다. 우리에게 어떤 것도 신성을 갖고 우리의 인격을 굴복시킬 대상은 없다는 선언입니다.
이 말씀을 듣자
11 절: 이에 마귀는 예수를 떠나고 천사들이 나아와 수종드니라.
놀랍게도 마가복음 1,13에서는 "들짐승과 함께 계시니"라고 말씀하시면서 아담과 하와가 지닌 첫 낙원에서의 모습을 보여주고 있습니다.
여기서 우리는 마지막 확인해야 할 것이 있습니다.
III. 예수 그리스도께서 유혹을 이기심으로 아담의 실패가 극복되었다는 사실입니다.
예수님의 모습은 첫 인간 아담의 실패에 대한 엄청난 안티데제입니다.
아담은 에덴의 풍요에서 유혹에 실패했으나, 예수는 광야에서 유혹을 물리치셨습니다.
(첫 인간의 유혹의 질문: 먹음직/ 보암직 /지혜롭게 할만큼 탐스럽다.
둘째 인간의 유혹의 질문: 배고품/인기/영광의 유혹
첫 인간의 응답: 말씀에 대한 왜곡과 불순종
둘째 인간의 응답: 말씀에 대한 증거와 순종
첫 인간의 결과: 죄와 죽음과 고통/ 둘째 인간의 결과: 용서와 생명과 구원의 복음이)
예수님이 아담의 실패를 성공으로, 아담의 불순종을 순종으로, 아담의 죽음을 생명으로 바꾸어 놓으셨습니다. 이제 우리는 예수 그리스도의 사람으로 이 땅에서 예수님의 승리와 순종과 생명을 지니고 하나님 나라의 일을 감당하는 사람들입니다.
하나님의 아들이신 예수님도 사탄의 시험을 받으셨다면, 그렇다면 시험이 없는 곳으로 도망갈 생각을 하지 말기 바랍니다. 오히려 인생에 유혹과 시험이 있다는 것을 알고 대담하게 부딪쳐 나가야 할 것입니다. 오늘날 우리의 삶도 하나의 광야와도 같습니다. 이 자리는 하나님앞에 서는 자리가 될 수도 있고, 사탄에게 유혹받는 자리가 될 수도 있습니다. 아니 이 양자가 우리 앞에 병존해 있는 것으로 보입니다.
여기서 우리가 분명히 확인 할 것은 예수님의 사탄에 대한 승리로 우리는 하나님의 자녀로 변했다는 사실입니다. 어둠과 죽음의 자리에서 이제는 빛과 생명의 자리에로 나아왔다는 사실입니다. 우리에게 성령이 동행하십니다. 예수와 동행하셨던 성령께서 우리의 연약함을 도우십니다. 성령께서 예수님을 사탄의 유혹에서 승리케 하신 것처럼 우리를 이기게 하실 것입니다. 예수님의 승리는 곧 우리 믿음의 사람들 모두의 승리입니다. (김 지 철: 장신대채플 2001년 10월 31일)

내가 사는 이유 그 하나

첫째, 조그만 집에서 작은 방에서 작은 그 모든 것을 다 소유의 개념으로 이해하지 않기 때문이다.  내가 아는 총 지식을 동원해서 "작다"는 말의 의미는 내가 아는 모든 "크다"라는 말의 반댓말일 뿐이다.  아직은 "작은 XXX"이지만 언젠가는 "큰 XXX"이 될 것 같다고 기도하며 내가 가지고 있는 그 모든 것을 이 둘 중의 하나로 만들어 본다.

둘째, "많다"와 "적다"는 첫번째에서 대조어로 "작다"와 "크다"의 관계를 논하는 방식과 동일하다.  현재는 "적은 XXX"으로 언젠가는 "많은 XXX"을 성취할 것이라고 생각하며 하루 하루가 지나간다.  이 수도 없이 많은 나날은 1년, 2년, 3년,...등등이 지나고 언젠가는 내 생애 모두를 다 합하는 날이 될 것이다.  그리고 내가 계산하는 시간은 그 중 아주 극히 일부에 불과하다.  그러나 이렇게 하찮은 시간 중 내가 할 수 있는 일의 성패가 모두 결정된다는 사실을 깨닫게 되면 될 수록 나의 삶은 더욱더 그 값어치를 헤아리기 평이해 질 것이다.

셋째, "젊다"와 "늙다"는 첫번째와 두번째에서 논한 관계 정의법과는 사뭇 다른 방법이 필요할 듯 하다.  여기에서는 단지 그 속도가 "빠르다" 혹은 "느리다"라는 시간에 대한 우리의 평범한 지식과 생각이 모두가 사용될 수 있다.  그 정도가 "많고" 혹은 "적고", 또는 "작고" 혹은 "크고", 또는 "짧고" 혹은 "길고"...  구불 구불 고갯길을 작은 발로 걷기 시작해서 그 끝에 도달했을 무렵 나의 삶은 더욱더 밝고 건강해지고 고요하고 평안해 지는 듯한 느낌이 든다. 

이러한 나의 현재의 삶의 주소는 바로 내 안의 영과 하나님과의 만남의 소중한 순간 순간이라고 생각이 되며 이 모든 값진 노력의 결과는 언젠가는 반드시 인정을 받을 수 있을 것이라고 굳게 믿고 있다. 

A Coffee and Donuts

커피와 도넛은 요즈음 젊은이들의 대표적인 기호식품이다.  신선한 커피콩은 갓 구워낸 듯 구수하고 향긋한 냄새가 으뜸이며 오븐에서 따끈따끈하게 구워져 나온 도너츠는 매우 맛있고 영양가가 많은 좋은 간식이며 식사대용이 될 수 있다.  오늘날 식탁의 메뉴가 더욱 다양해 지기를 기원하며 오늘은 커피와 도너츠를 이렇게 소개하고자 한다.  크리스피 크림 도너츠가 무척 큰 대형 커피, 도너츠 매장으로 한국에서 미국의 던킨 도너츠와 함께 많은 대중의 사랑을 받고 있다. 

말, 말, 말...

언어는 삶의 중요한 중심이 되어 사람들은 말로 인생을 설계한다.  주변 사람들, 환경, 그리고 수도 없이 많은 주요 사건과 전환점, 성장과 발전을 거듭하며 쉴새없이 돌아가는 시계의 수래바퀴 속에서 인간이 만들어 온 언어는 그 역사를 인류사와 같이 하였다.  한때는 낡고 오래되어 보존이 어려운 흙, 파피루스, 나뭇잎, 종이 등으로 기록되고 만들어져 왔던 말은 어느새 그 큰 시간의 흐름을 따라서 흘러 흘러 와서 21세기 현재에는 반영구적, 혹은 영구적으로 기계와 천연재료, 그리고 그 주 원천인 인간의 몸과 마음 모두를 통 틀어서 보다 더욱 많은 결실을 맺게 되었다.  그 중 가장 괄목할 만한 성과로는 인간의 언어는 더이상 그 출발점을 단순화된 인간의 언어중추에서만 찾지 않는다는 점이다.  오늘날 보다 폭넓게 허용된 지식인의 네트워크와 포럼 및 지식 산업의 메카로 자리매김한 대학 및 전세계적으로 그 수적으로나 양적으로 보다 큰 효과를 가져오는 인간 세계의 주요 커뮤니케이션 센터에서 인간의 언어는 단순한 전달 도구로서 이를 사용하고 끊임없이 재평가, 분석, 확인으로 설계도를 바꾸어 가는 인간의 가슴과 마음 저 한편에서 더 나아가 인간의 이상적인 삶의 중추로 더욱 많은 사물과 주변 환경에서 그 가치를 더 할 수 있게 되었다.  이를 모두 이해하고 알아가는 것은 언어를 만들고 사용하는 인간의 몫인 듯 하다.  한때는 사람의 머리만 언어의 중추로 기계를 붙여서 머리에서 나오는 뇌파와 호르몬의 이동만으로 사람의 생명과 언어의 관계를 연구하였다.  그러나 이제는 단순한 한 개개인의 행동과 행태, 심리 상태의 오랜 기간 동안 계속된 관찰, 분석, 평가로만 인간의 언어와 역사를 연구하고 기록, 보존하는 일은 그다지 그 가치가 충분히 인정되지 않은 듯 하다.  단순히 누가 어떤 내용의 말을 하고 이러한 말을 듣고 또한 누가 어떤 내용의 답을 하는 등등의 예전 방식을 이용한 정보사업과 지식사업은 그다지 그 효과를 십분 발휘하지 못하고 있다.  예를 들면 A라는 사람이 복권집에서 복권 한 장을 사서 그 당첨 여부를 확인하려고 한다.  복권을 사고 당첨을 점치는 행위 자체는 예전과 지금은 그다지 차이가 있지 않다고 본다.  그러나 A는 그가 한 행위 그 액면의 값어치를 떠나서 그의 미래와 비전 사업을 스스로 설계하고 주변 인물들에게 알려주는 역할을 동시에 하고 있다.  예전에 A는 단순히 복권을 사던 고객이자 소비자였지만 오늘날 A는 복권에 투자를 하는 개인 투자자도 되었으며 그 복권을 파는 회사의 주식도 사고 시장과 산업 전반에 걸쳐 그의 한 표를 과감히 행사하는 보다 민주적이고 주체적인 지역 사회의 주인공으로 다시 그 부활을 거듭하고 있다.  또한 경제학 적이고 사회학 적이며 역사, 정치학, 법학 등등의 인류의 역사를 통틀어 탄생한 그 모든 지적인 행위와 네트워크의 흐름은 이제는 더이상 개별적인 독립된 학문으로서만으로 인정을 받지를 못한다.  이를 보다 창의적이고 건설적인 사고로 스스로의 삶을 자유스럽게 설계하는 개개인의 역할과 책임이 무척 더 가치있는 사업이 되었다.  쌍방향 및 멀티 채널 구축 및 주변의 모든 사물과 환경을 하나로 통폐합 할 수 있는 단일 시스템 구축만을 오늘날의 미디어와 네트워크라고 정의 내리는 오늘날의 일부 사람들의 언어는 더이상은 호소력이 있지 않은 듯 하다.  젊음, 용기, 그리고 무엇보다도 결단력 있고 독창적이며 창의적으로 사고하는 건강한 젊은이가 그 근간이 되어 보다 많은 결실이 맺어지길 기원하는 바이다.

Drinking an Iced Raspberry Mocha At Hollys--

커피는 내가 좋아하는 음료이다.  아침, 점심, 저녁 하루에 세끼의 식사와 오후의 커피 한 잔은 내가 아는 식단 전부이다.  내가 아는 가장 좋은 커피는 향이 좋고 약간의 과일의 맛과 향이 있으며 달지 않고 부드러운 모카 커피이다.  시원한 아이스 래즈베리 모카는 내가 찾는 단골 메뉴.

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La Vita Bella A La Ja-Yoon Choi Inc (I)

내가 도착한 곳은 작고 어두운 어느 골목 길.  그 곳에서 나의 유일한 벗은 하늘과 땅, 그리고 마음속에 묻어놓은 작은 은행잎.  아기 나무가 몸속에서 뿌리를 내려서 어느새 나는 한 그루의 작고 어린 나무로 다시 태어났다.  일어나서 잠자리에 들때까지 나의 가슴은 작은 잎사귀들의 속삭임과 흔들리는 바람의 소리로 하루 종일 조용할 수가 없다.  내가 가는 곳곳마다 그리고 마침내 인적 드문 그 작은 길에서 우두커니 홀로 서서 작은 떨림과 소용돌이를 잠재워 본다.  나는 많은 이들의 애환어린 시선과 간절한 소망으로 반짝반짝 빛나는 눈망울들 속에서 그들의 아픔을 같이 해 보기도 한다.  내가 가는 곳과 내가 머무는 자리마다 이들의 작은 발자국들이 하나, 둘씩 점점 늘어나며 내 가슴 속에 커가는 작은 한 그루의 나무의 나이테의 숫자처럼 내게 큰 위안이자 삶을 더욱 풍요롭게 해주는 많은 즐거움으로 어느새 내게 끊이지 않는 그림속의 새로운 주인공들로 많은 영감을 줄 것이다.  내가 도달하는 작은 길과 내가 쉬고 있는 가슴속의 작은 아기나무는 내가 가진 모든 것이지만 이러한 작은 인생의 한 뒤 편에서 쉴새없이 돌아가는 작은 나침반과 시계의 태엽소리는 나의 앞길을 끊임없이 밝혀주는 한 줄기의 빛이 되는 것이 아닐까 하는 생각이 든다.  처음에는 무척 많은 슬픔과 아픔, 그리고 많은 고통이 따라와서 무척이나 힘든 인생으로 삶의 무게가 무척이나 무거웠으나 이제는 나이가 점점 늘어가면서 생기는 삶의 지혜와 나만의 시각, 안목이 더욱더 내게 중요하게 자리매김하는 듯하다.  아름다운 인생의 그 첫번째 이야기는 이러하다.  내가 처음 이 세상에서 숨을 쉬게 되었을 때 비로소 나의 몸과 영혼은 나의 인생과 운명을 같이 할 수 있게 되었다.  그리고 지금 나는 그 두번째의 인생의 첫 테이프를 막 끊게 되었다.  지금껏 살아온 세월보다 더 많이 살기 위해서 내가 준비해야 하는 일은 무척 많다.  또한 소중한 생명을 누구보다도 더욱더 잘 가꾸며 살기 위해서 나는 하루 하루 다짐을 새롭게 해본다.      

It takes the last 34 yrs or the last 33 yrs to restore my normal life for now!?!?!?

Mom and dad, I am now turning to 34 (in Korean age) or 33 (in American age).  It is very grateful to remember the entire timeline of my own personal history during the particular period of time.  As a matter of fact, I am just an ordinary girl with ordinary goals and life schedule, and having so many people around just to take advantage of me.  In fact, I went to kindergarten, schools, university and even a famous graduate school abroad.  And here I am living so alone with no hope nor no future  in my head.  Just because I must prove that I lived my life with people for goods or ills, I have to wait and wait for a boy to get married and another story goes on.  I guess it is very very sad, and crazy.  Just a girl in search of her normal life, bought by a cheap porno site owner who keep taking advantage of an old girl like myself.  Can you imagine how odd and strange this life could look like?  Can you go out and dance with people, talking normal?  Who was you?  Should you go all over again just to make people breathe and stay with at no risk?  My parents are not politician, nor a diplomat, playing games in their head.  They are very simple and righteous.  Just to raise their kid like other kids at home.  I don't see a reason of making excuses and speaking ill of people around.  At my age, people get retired and have a long silver plan to cover series of bills and so on.  And the best way to recover and get back to my normal life is simply to turn away from such hazardous environments with full of malevolent neighbors or ambitious friends or offensive enemies around.  This is what I used to have a say with, regarding on all things, good or bad.  So this is just to get back to my life and preparing for life with more prospects and visions ahead.  I would say the same since I was a little kid, living with parents.  It is very awkward and strange, however, is very healthy and normal to get real.  Thanks buddy!!!  After all, it was a great enlightenment for me. :)

Daydream (I)

in a day light I wonder...

we enjoyed a sip of coffee and a small talk at cafe...

be yourself with all your might...

sitting next to a stranger drinking a soda...

I am strumming my guitar to keep up

with all sounds of mother nature...

can't get out of him/her in my head...

'cause I often speak to myself...

what a beautiful day it was...

so I start singing on with my old memories...

haunting and dreary...

honey, I've got a work to do...

so back to you with my new song...

it was love after all...

The Hellish School Life (Episode II)

학교 다니는 것이 즐겁고 유일한 낙인 나에게 늑깎이 공부는 더할나위 없이 즐겁다.  단지 예전에 비해서 주변에 보이는 사물과 사람이 같은 것이 아니라서 내가 읽는 책과 논문 모두는 나의 것이 아니고 내가 같이 하는 공동체의 공동 소유물이 되어서 무엇보다도 지적재산권 시비에 말릴 듯 하여 조심스러워 진다.

한국에서는 아직까지 학생들이 편집을 잘하여 논문을 쓰고 학위를 취득하기 때문에 그렇지 않은 외국과 의견 조율을 하기에 너무나 턱없이 부족한 시간과 돈이라고 생각한다.  일년남짓 정말로 올인을 하여 열심히 공부를 하려고 한다.  내가 후회없이 할 수 있는 일들과 프로젝트들은 모두 지금 다 이루어야 할 일 들이기에 예전에 여유있게 한 공부가 이제는 그렇게 쉽지가 않다.

혹시 주변에서 듣고 나쁜 생각을 하게 될 지, 아님 문제를 만들어서 사회를 어지럽게 만들지, 내가 생각하는 모든 생각과 이론이 주변 이들의 눈살을 찌뿌리게 만들지는 모르지만, 내가 아는 한국인과 미국인, 이태리인은 그렇지가 않다.  미국, 이태리, 한국, 이 세개의 나라는 내가 아는 세계 전부이다.  더욱 잘 알기에는 내가 모르는 것이 너무나 많기 때문에 그래서 나는 이러한 종류의 투자를 무척 기피하는 사람들은 누구보다도 잘 안다. 

옛날에는 직접 이동하면서 기록하고 대화하고 전쟁도 하면서 어렵게 공부를 했지만 이제는 편하게 집에서 노트북 하나로 세계 여러곳의 나라에 대해서 탐방을 하여 공부를 할 수 있게 되었다.  나만이 아는 세계가 아니라 각양각색의 인종과 신분, 계급을 모두 초월한 지상천국에서 나의 생활은 무척 즐거워 진다.

다행히 부모와 친, 인척, 주변 이웃 모두 그다지 크게 상관을 하지 않는다.  아이들이 납치, 유괴되는 일이 다시는 있어서는 안 될 것이다.  또한 병에 걸리거나 사고가 나는 일이 발생하지 않기 위해서 나도 학부모가 되어서 적극적으로 사고하고 행동을 같이 하려고 한다.

내가 아는 학교는 이제 닫힌 상아탑이 아니다.  어디를 가나 내가 아는 사람과 사물, 그리고 이웃들을 만날수 있는 지상 천국과 낙원, 그것이 내가 평생동안 이루고 싶은 소원이다.  더이상 친구와 적이 아닌 같은 공동체의 일원으로 같이 맑고 깨끗한 공기를 같이 마시고 호흡하며 같이 잘 살아야 한다는 다짐으로 나는 더욱더 책임감을 가지고 하루 하루를 살아야 한다.

더욱더 모범적인 인간으로 다시 태어나서 많은 좋은 일을 하겠다는 다짐을 하여 본다.

The Hellish School Life (Episode I)

내가 처음 학교에 입학해서 학생이 되어 공부를 시작한 때는 한국 나이로 여덟살이 되어서였다.  책가방 매고 너무나 좋아서 학교에 정말로 가고 싶다며 동네 한바퀴를 소리소리 지르며 "아저씨, 아줌마, 저 학교가요.  정말로 공부 열심히 할 거에요!!!"하면서 열심히 돌아다녔다.  우선은 그 굳은 다짐을 모든 이가 다 알아야 된다고 생각해서였을 것이다.  책가방 매고 아침마다 등교하는 오빠, 언니가 너무나 부러웠는데 드디어 나도 학교를 다니게 됬다고 너무나 기쁘고 행복해서 집과 학교 근처의 아파트와 백화점, 구멍가게 곳곳마다 돌아다니면서 동네 이웃들 모두에게 나를 소개했다.  "신촌 초등학교 1학년 최자윤이에요..."  주변에 보는 사람들이나 방문하는 장소는 내가 특별하게 지정하지는 앉았지만 정말로 안 가본 곳이 없었다.  그래 작은 두발로 갈 수 있는 모든 곳을 다 가보는 거야.  사실 집에서 학교까지는 무척 먼 거리었다.  그래도 작은 발로 열심히 뛰고 걸어 다녔다. 

내가 처음 초등학교에 입학을 한 뒤에 한 일은 친구들과 선생님들과 잘 지내보기였다.  그리고 무엇보다도 공부를 열심히 했다.  성적도 좋고 주변 이웃들과 학교 직원 및 선생님, 학생 모두 학교 생활을 잘 하고 있었다.  아침에 등교하면 교문에서 교장선생님이 학생들 모두에게 손을 흔들어 주며 응대를 하시고 학생들 모두는 반드시 교장선생님에게 인사를 해야 한다고 했다.  처음에 등교길이 익숙하지가 않은데도 엄마는 같이 가 주지 않으셨고, 반드시 혼자 등교를 다 할 수 있어야 한다고 하셨다.  구불 구불 모르는 길을 다 통과해서 학교까지 가는 것이 어린 나에게는 큰 하나의 과제이자 숙제였는데, 엄마는 항상 집에서 내게 이 모든 과제를 다 마쳐야 한다고 채근해셨다.  집에서 보내는 시간보다 밖에서 친구들 혹은 혼자서 노는 시간이 무척 많았기에 나는 너무나 뛸듯이 기뻤고 더욱 즐거운 학교생활을 할 수가 있었다.

지금은 학교를 졸업한지 꽤 되는 늑깎이 아줌마가 되었다.  어른이 되서 책을 다시 본다는 것은 많은 용기가 필요한 듯하다.  등교시 손 흔들고 악수해 주시는 교장선생님도 없고 주변의 이웃과 친지, 가족 모두의 양해를 얻으며 나만의 사업이나 프로젝트를 수행하기가 무척 힘이 들다.  그러나 공부는 평생 공부라고 배운 내게 책보기가 그렇게 어려운 것은 아닌 것 같다.  문제는 책을 이해할 때 전과 무척 달라져서 주변을 열심히 뛰어 다니며 소리소리 지르던 어린 시절과 달리 어른으로서 지켜야 할 예의범절과 규율, 규칙, 법이 있기에 무척 조심스러워 진다.  어린이를 주의깊게 지켜보는 어른은 있지가 않다.  그러나 어른들은 서로를 끊임없이 견제하고 또 견제하기 때문에 어른, 성인이 된 지금의 나는 다른 모습으로 거듭 나기를 바라고 있는 실정이다.

예전과 같은 자유가 없는 지금 다시 책을 보기 시작하며 내게 주어진 과제는 나의 인생을 더욱더 책임감을 가지고 완성해 가야 한다는 사명감이 되어야 할 것이다.  그리고 보다 더욱 좋은 일을 많이 해야 한다고 생각한다.  또한 더욱더 사랑받는 사람이 되며 사랑을 줄 수 있는 큰 사람이 되어야 한다고 다짐한다.

우리집 식구의 추석 나기 제 1화

올해 막내를 장가보내고 가족이 처음으로 같이 추석을 보낸다.  무엇보다 가족 한 사람이 더 늘어나서 좋고 앞으로 아기가 태어나면 더욱더 가족이 평화롭고 여유로워지지 않을까 생각해 본다.  두 아이들이 모두가 건강하고 튼튼하기 때문에 아기도 건강하고 튼튼하고 공부잘하고 착하고 가족의 일원으로서 새로운 식구 모두 할 일이 많아 지는 것 같다.  추석은 한국의 Thanksgiving Day이다.  한국에는 달리 국가의 종교가 없어진 오늘날 구식으로 옛 왕정때의 가족 모시기와 가족 중심의 사고가 조금은 어색해 진 시점에서 추석을 온 가족과 같이 하는 오늘, 내일은 정말로 가족의 역사 뿐만 아니라 한국의 역사와 같이 하여 무엇인가가 해내고 있는 듯한 뿌듯한 마음으로 기쁘기 그지없다.  내가 태어난 조국과 사람들 모두가 하나가 되어 같은 땅에서 태어난 그 날을 기억하고 더 나아가서는 모두가 더욱 풍요롭고 여유로운 조국을 만들어 간다는 데에서 외국의 Thanksgiving Day와는 큰 차이가 있다고 하겠다.  추석에 한 집에 모여서 반찬 만들고 제사 음식 만들고 같이 오손도손 모여 앉아서 묵은 얘기, 새로운 소식 모두를 같이 하는 그 시간 만큼 소중한 일은 없다고 하겠다.  요즘은 애국자가 되어야지 생존하는 시대이며 추석에 가족 행사에 참석하여 가족과 같이 하는 그 시간과 행위 모두는 세상에 태어나서 가장 행복하고 기쁜 사실이 되어야 할 것이다.  추석이 단풍과 솔잎, 그리고 송편을 먹는 날로 기억이 되지 않을 것이다.  조금 욕심을 내 본다면 나라 만들기에 우리 가족 모두가 하나가 되어서 일편단심으로 열심히 살고 반드시 생존해야 할 것이다.  요즈음 같이 힘든 시절에 어려운 이웃과 같이 아픔과 슬픔을 같이 하고 모두가 같이 희노애락을 나눌 수 있는 좋은 장소가 바로 큰 집이 아닌가 한다.  또한 추석은 좋은 명절이고 가족 식구가 한국인이든 외국인이든 모두 하나가 되어 한국의 역사를 같이 만들어가는 소중한 시간이 아닌가 한다. 

어느 한 여름날의 조우 (에피소드 하나)

무더위의 작열하는 태양 아래 내가 가지고 있는 전 재산 달랑 핸드폰 하나와 낡고 오래된 지갑, 핸드백, 그리고 나는 동네 슈퍼에서 푼돈 3000원으로 담배 한 갑과 라이터를 샀다.  나의 처량하고 슬픈 처지는 이제 막 붙인 담배 한 개피에서 피어나오는 작고 가냘픈 연기 속에서 공허함을 말해주고 있을 뿐이다.  흙 먼지 바람과 길 한 구석에 처박혀 있는 낡고 오래되어 볼품이 없어진 공원 벤치 하나를 두고 나의 무거운 몸은 축축 늘어져 더욱 주변이들의 이목을 끌고 있다.  내가 기다리고 있는 시간은 이제 하루, 이틀, 사흘, 그리고 얼마나 더 지속이 될는지는 잘 모르겠다.  두리번 두리번 주변에서 길가는 행인들을 보는 나의 시선은 갈피를 잡기가 힘들다.  내 손에서 이제는 더이상 피우기 어렵도록 작아진 마지막 담배꽁초에서 나의 하루가 모두 다 한 줌의 재와 연기로 멀리 사라진 것 같다. 

한참을 기다리다가 나는 주변의 이상한 기운을 느끼고 오늘도 정전이 오거나 테러리스트들이 어딘가에서 폭탄을 투척할 것만 같은 두려움과 공포속에서 조심스럽게 발걸음을 옮긴다.  어느 자살클럽의 회원과 마주친다면 나는 내가 먹고 있는 인터넷의 비아그라 실험단의 최신 버전으로 내 몸에서 스물스물 기어나오는 연기와 기운을 온 몸으로 받아들이며 꿈틀거리기 시작하는 나의 욕구와 충동에 그만 파리의 한 공원이나 언덕에서 뒹굴고 있는 연인의 모습을 꿈꾸며 그만 눈을 감고 고개를 떨구며 바르르 떨리는 사지와 내 마음을 추스리지 못하고 그만 다시 숨이 멎어버린다.  내 몸과 마음은 이제 버러지와 굼벵이과 구데기가 득실득실하여 더이상은 살아있는 몸이 아니다.  걸어서 나온 나의 집에서 피어오르던 숨과 기운이 이제 작열하는 태양 아래에서는 볼 품 없는 한 갖 작은 벌레의 배설물과 같이 나의 몸 속에서 작은 몸부림을 하고 있는 듯 하다.  집에서 나온지 한 참 뒤에 나는 다시 주변 환경과 인물들의 몸과 마음과 하나가 되어서 호흡을 같이 하고 담배 연기를 깊숙히 들이마시고...  그리고 다시 나 자신을 추스려 본다.

배부르게 점심을 먹고 난 뒤 나는 정말로 세상에서 가장 행복한 사람이 되어서 버러지같은 인생의 한 끄트머리를 부여잡고 한숨을 한번 길게 내쉬고 들이마신다.  진짜로 좋다. :)  내가 아는 가장 어려운 한 여름의 조우는 바로 가장 평범하기 그지없어 보이는 일상 생활이다.  음악을 배울때 느린 박자와 리듬에 어려움을 가장 많이 느꼈듯이, 내게 천천히라는 말은 그다지 쉽지는 않다.  가장 쉬운 빠르게로 가다가 이렇게 더운 여름 천천히 주변 사물과 함께 하는 내 자신은 어느덧 저물어 가는 하루에서 그다지 많은 영향을 발휘하지는 못하는 듯 하다.  이러한 내가 가진 모든 것은 내가 원하는 것 모두의 방식대로 움직여 주지는 않지만 많은 일들이 동시다발적으로 일어날 때 나 스스로를 가다듬고 추스릴 수 있도록 많은 도움을 주는 듯 하다.  천천히 천천히 나 자신을 제일 잘 알 수 있는 만남은 바로 이렇게 시작되지 않은 가 싶다.  사람은 그 다음이 아닐까 한다.  사람은 사람이지만 우선 내 자신의 몸과 영혼이 건강하기를 기원해 본다.

My Dancing Shadow Wearing The Willow

어느날 작은 소년이 나에게 다가와 속삭이며 말했다네.  내 가슴에 누군가가 달아 놓은 버드나무 가지 하나가 나의 상처받은 옛 사랑 얘기를 말해 준다네.  내가 사랑한 한 예쁘고 귀여운 소녀는 다른 이의 품 속에서 나를 버리고 어느새 작은 깃털이 되어 잠들어 있다고...  너무나 가슴이 아퍼서 나는 하루 종일 어두운 방에서 두 눈이 퉁퉁 불어서 어찌할 줄 모르고... 내가 새로이 찾은 보금자리는 이제 나의 옛 짝이 버리고 간 가제도구와 기타 등등의 물건에 배어있는 숨결과 옛 시간에 대한 향수에 내가 가진 모든 것이 다 한 줌의 재와 먼지가 되어 허공속에서 그 자취를 감추게 되었다고...나의 사랑, 나의 연인은 내가 아는 모든 꽃과 내가 가지고 있는 기억과 추억, 바람, 물, 산들바람 그 어디선가에서 아직 살아 숨쉬고 있다고... 이제 내게 그녀는 작은 나비가 되었나.  아님 이젠 나의 하늘과 땅이 되어 내 가슴 속에 작은 파문을 끊임없이 일으키고 있다.  나는 어디선가에서 그녀를 쫓아서 정처없이 바리때기 손에 들고 가가호호 묻고 또 물으며 여행을 하네.  아직 내게 사랑은 하나뿐이다.  누군가 내게 묻는다면 나는 큰 소리로 그녀의 이름을 부를 것이다.  xx야, 사랑해!!!

An Unusual Day of A Lady in Blue--

Imagine a world full of the rainy and dreary seasons like monsoon in Asia...  Wet and hot everyday with water of no quality and no taste... How odd just to jump in and endeavor to life in a fancy skirt and a pretty blouse!!!

In life suitable for a lady in blue, all at your might,

see your heart twists and turns at a loss

Once in a spoonful amount of sugar and tea leaves,

Cry in joy and sorrow, you are changing and singing in one piece, B/C you are alive and so dear,

Baby, you are so good and illuminating in a whole sum of life and many blessings,

In an unusual day of a lady in blue...

:)

Enjoy!!!

이슬비가 오는 어느 나른한 여름날...

창 밖에 이슬비가 부슬부슬 오는 어느 나른한 여름날 오후에 나는 발길을 돌려 단지 내의 패션 전문 마트에서 기분 좋게 시간을 보내고 있다.  부시시한 머리의 아줌마에서 가볍고 산뜻한 여름옷 자태를 선보이는 나이 어린 학생과 아가씨들 모두가 한 폭의 그림이 되어 가로수 길을 걸어가고 있다.  비온 후에 흙내음, 풀내음, 벌레 소리 모두가 하나되어 나의 기억 저 너머로 어디엔가에서 나도 모르는 하나의 언어가 되어 오늘같은 어느 한 여름날을 표현해 주겠지...

(To Be Continued)  

귀여니와 작은 동생의 어느 평범하지 않은 하루

어느새 많이 가까워진 작은 동생은 오늘도 여지없이 소란스럽게 하루를 시작하고 귀여니는 고민을 하기 시작한다.

지독스럽게나 요란스럽게나 주변의 이목과 시선을 받고자 부지런히 돌아다니는 동생의 모습은 정말로 평범하지가 않다.  누가 봐도 정말 대단한 아이 같다. :)

이리 투덜 저리 투덜 볼맨소리로 여기 저기 돌아다니며 어린 동생은 어느새 우리집 화단 앞에 새로 새워진 작은 풀 한 포기가 되어 버렸다.  참고로 우리집 화단에는 꽃과 잡초 (야생풀)가 참 많다.  그리고 뿌리를 굳건하게 깊숙하게 작은 자갈밭에서 그 작은 무게를 지탱하느라고 오늘도 무척 바지런한 듯 하다.  작은 풀로 다시 태어난 작은 동생은 정말로 엉뚱하고도 이상한 말을 자주 한다. :)

벌레가 붙어서 가려운지 달팽이 때문에 겁이 나는지 어린 풀 한 포기가 바르르 몸을 떨 때면 여지 없이 어디선가 한줄기의 작은 바람이 집으로 마실오는 듯 하다.  나도 조금 떨린다.  마주 앉아서 자꾸만 관심을 가져달라는 작은 풀 한 포기가 된 동생이 손짓을 하면 귓전에 들리는 고요한 풍경 소리와 뱃고동 소리에 나도 같이 저 멀리 작은 동생과 같이 이색적이고 색다른 맛의 여행을 떠나게 되는 듯 하여 무척 흥분이 된다.

부르르 떠는 어린 풀의 몸에서 떨어지는 작은 고요함과 이슬, 그리고 바람들...

그 작은 흔들림과 몸짓이 어느새 나에게는 너무나도 익숙해 지는 듯 하다.  

Writing a few lines of my own...

Imagine your world is full of people and places, and most of all, time.

With all your might and willingness to grow and develop it on your own, you should have:

your pens,

notebooks,

erasers,

or

your notebook computer,

mouse,

memory drive,

any sort of the software,

eccetera, eccetera...

 

Whatever you choose to live with, you will surely succeed and thrive,...

Only if you keep on moving and changing without losing

your dreams...

 

Thanks!

 

Ja-Yoon Choi or A La Ja-Yoon Choi Inc.

 

Follow your heart and soul, not just a mere sound and rhythm of your life. 

No more fantasy nor any sort of pretenses...

b/c you are young, energetic, and passionate,

enough to keep on running for your cause of action!!!

To build up your world and business et al,

keep on and take over the world!!!

오늘은 처음으로 4차원 커피숍에 왔어요--

오늘은 처음으로 4차원 커피숍에 왔어요--

이모가 사탕도 줬어요--

재미있어요--

호호호--

하하하--

헤헤헤--

히히히--

후후후--

이모가 컴퓨터를 하고 있어요--

나도 크면 할 수 있어요--

지금은 아직 어려서요--

조금 더 기다리면 언니, 오빠처럼 키도 클 거에요--

엄마, 아빠하고 재미있게 놀아요--

오늘은 정말 재미있게 놀아요--

깡총깡총 뛰어 놀아요--

나 이거 할래요--

나 저거 할래요--

나 다 할래요--

그런데 어른들은 왜 내가 원하는 것을

다 주지 않나요?

사탕도 맛있게 먹고요--

장난감도 좋아요--

정말 많이 많이 놀래요--

공부도 할래요--

헤헤헤

하하하

호호호

히히히

ㅎㅎㅎ

친구하고 재미있게 놀고 싶어요

그리고 신나게 웃어봐요

하하하

호호호

히히히

헤헤헤

ㅎㅎㅎ

스마일~~~

참 좋아요--

re: 공자, 논어의 위정편 중

15 나는 열 다섯 살에 학문에 뜻을 두었고
30 서른 살에 (학문상) 자립했다.
40 마흔 살에는 미혹하지 않게 되었고
50 쉰살에 하늘의 명을 알게 되었다.
60 예순 살에는 남의 말을 순순히 이해하게 되었고
70 일흔 살이 되니 마음내키는 대로 해도 법도를 넘어서지 않았다.

=======================================================================
=======================================================================

The Elements of Style, William Strunk JR. and E.B. White, Forword by Roger Angell:

Contents--

Foreword
Introduction

I. Elementary Rules of Usage
1. Form the possessive singular of nouns by adding 's.
2. In a series of three or more terms with a single conjunction, use a comma after each term
except the last.
3. Enclose parenthetic expressions between commas.
4. Place a comma before a conjunction introducing an independent clause.
5. Do not join independent clauses with a comma.
6. Do not break sentences in two.
7. Use a colon after an independent clause to introduce a list of particulars, an appositive, an
amplification, or an illustrative quotation.
8. Use a dash to set off an abrupt break or interruption and to announce a long appositive or
summary.
9. The number of the subject determines the number of the verb.
10. Use the proper case of pronoun.
11. A particular phrase at the beginning of a sentence must refer to the grammatical subject.

II. Elementary Principles of Composition

12. Choose a suitable design and hold to it.
13. Make the paragraph th eunit of composition.
14. Use the active voice.
15. put statements in positive form.
16. Use definite, specific, concrete language.
17. Omit needless words.
18. Avoid a succession of loose sentences.
19. Express coordinate ideas in similar form.
20. Keep related words together.
21. In summaries, keep to one tense.
22. Place the emphatic words of a sentence at the end.

III. A Few Matters of Form

IV. Words and Expressions Commonly Misused

V. An Approach to Style (With a List of Reminders)

1. Place yourself in the background.
2. Write in a way that comes naturally.
3. Work from a suitable design.
4. Write with nouns and verbs.
5. Revise and rewrite.
6. Do not overwrite.
7. Do not overstate.
8. Avoid the use of qualifiers.
9. Do not affect a breezy manner.
10. Use orthodox spelling.
11. Do not explain too much.
12. Do not construct awkward adverbs.
13. make sure the reader knows who is speaking.
14. Avoid fancy words.
15. Do not use dialect unless your ear is good.
16. Be clear.
17. Do not inject opinion.
18. Use figures of speech sparingly.
19. Do not take shortcuts at the cost of clarity.
20. Avoid foreign languages.
21. Prefer the standard to the offbeat.

Afterword

Glossary

Index

=====================================================================
==================================================================

What is counterfeit and afterwards--

As concerned copyrights and permission to use of a certain material in a designated format, each individual or any sort of entity (legal, I say) should be adhered to the original text of his/her relevant business individual or any sort of entity (legal, I say), under care of a "rightful" authority. The rest of the details, I guess, is totally up to the justifiability of the work(s) between two parties, who are "actually" against each other.
I guess, first of all, it is very much controversial to put it in a right category, because, according to law or rules or code, there must be someone who chase its breakers. In a case such as this (I say, a case of "Counterfeit and Afterwards"), there should be a way out just to clear out ambiguity and giving more feedbacks into the public.
===

You will never be fired!!!

Tell your friends they're fired!‏

From:
ACLU (action@aclu.org)

Sent:
Friday, April 04, 2008 11:09:14 AM

Reply-to:
ACLU (action@aclu.org)

To:
kdoublehs@jhu.edu

Thank you for telling your representative you oppose electronic employment verification.

Can you take a moment to let your friends know about this outrageous bill and ask them to send their representative a loud and clear message that NO American should lose their job because of a buggy employment database?

Just cut and paste the following text into an email and send it to your friends.

***********************************************************************

Subject: You're fired!

Those are two words that would get anyone’s attention. They certainly caught my attention!

But those are the words that millions of Americans could hear if Congress passes the SAVE Act.

The SAVE Act would require every employer in the U.S. to use so-called “electronic employment verification,” cross-checking all current and potential employees’ citizenship status against databases that the government itself knows are filled with errors and inaccuracies.

And what if the Social Security Administration or Department of Homeland Security get it wrong and can’t verify a person’s citizenship or right to work using their buggy database? Tough luck. That person is out of a job, with no right to appeal. I thought you would like to know about this and would want to do something about it. To take action, just follow the link below.

http://action.aclu.org/saveact

I Servizi On-Line: Il Magazzino di "Due Torri"

Servizi Extranet-Magazzini On-line:

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magazzino
[Enciclopedie - Enciclopedia generale]
magazzino (regionale magazzèno), sm. [sec. XIV; dall'arabo makāhzin, pl. di makhāzan, deposito]. 1.... § I magazzini svolgono un ruolo essenziale nelle industrie (magazzino per il deposito delle scorte di materiali destinati alla lavorazione e magazzino per lo stoccaggio dei prodotti finiti
Magazzìno
[Enciclopedie - Dizionario dei bambini]
magazzinière magazzìno màggio maggiolìno maggioràna maggiorànza maggiordòmo maggióre maggiorènne... magazzìno(sostantivo maschile) Deposito di merci
Odi: il magazzino-vendita della cooperativa tessile Lentswe
[Immagini, animazioni, audio, video - Geografia]
Canale GeografiaGalleria Multimediale Odi: il magazzino-vendita della cooperativa tessile Lentswe CERCA NELLA GALLERIA MULTIMEDIALE Odi: il magazzino-vendita della cooperativa tessile Lentswe (Immagine 12 Kb
Manuale sillàbico ovvéro il magazzino dei vassalli fedéli, Un-
[Enciclopedie - Enciclopedia generale]
Manuale sillàbico ovvéro il magazzino dei vassalli fedéli, Un- (Kana-Dehon Chushin-gura), dramma in 11 atti del giapponese Takeda Izumo, scritto per marionette (prima rappresentazione al teatro Takemoto-za di Ōsaka nel 1748) e divenuto poi il più famoso chushingura. Il successo dell'opera deriva
magazzèno
[Enciclopedie - Enciclopedia generale]
magazzèno variante regionale di magazzino
warehouse to warehouse
[Enciclopedie - Enciclopedia generale]
warehouse to warehouse (inglese, da magazzino a magazzino), nei contratti per il trasporto di merci via mare, la clausola riguardante i rischi a cui è esposta la merce nel trasporto dal magazzino del trasportante a quello del destinatario
magazzinàggio
[Enciclopedie - Enciclopedia generale]
magazzinàggio sm. [sec. XVIII; da magazzino]. Deposito di merci in magazzino; prezzo corrispondente ai diritti di magazzino, riferito all'unità di merce e al tempo di permanenza
magazzinière
[Enciclopedie - Enciclopedia generale]
magazzinière sm. (f. -a) [sec. XVIII; da magazzino]. Chi ha in custodia un magazzino, con il compito di vigilare sulla conservazione e la sicurezza delle merci
coppàia
[Enciclopedie - Enciclopedia generale]
coppàia sf. (anche coppàio, sm.) [sec. XVII; da coppo]. Magazzino in cui si tengono i coppi
Kana-Dehon Chushin-gura
[Enciclopedie - Enciclopedia generale]
Kana-Dehon Chushin-gura titolo originale del dramma giapponese Un manuale sillabico ovvero Il magazzino dei vassalli fedeli
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::AREA DEMO::

Ginseng's Pharmacological Character Afterwards--

In terms of 'power', it has 4 features: cold, hot, warm, and cool. They tell you about the strength or weakness of the pharmacological effect and their consistency.

Additionally, all herbal medicines are categorized into the following list of tastes:

• Kambo: sweet; invigorates strength(ginseng).
• Shinsan: spicy hot; helps in diffusion and perspiration.
• Kohan: bitter; reduces fever and lowers temperature.
• Sansap: sour; stops hormone oversecretion and diarrhea by astriction.
• Hamyon: salty; softens and tenderizes.

They are also distinguished according to color:

• blue acts on the liver;
• black acts on the kidneys;
• white acts on the lungs;
• yellow acts on the spleen;
• red acts on the heart.

Genetic link tied to smoking addiction on Yahoo! Health

 

Genetic link tied to smoking addiction on Yahoo! Health

오늘은 두번째로 엑셀을 합니다--

오늘은 두번째로 엑셀을 합니다--
제대로 배울려면 정말 길은 그다지 짧지는 않은 듯 하네요...
컴에 초짜라서요...

무척 답답해 하는 주변분들에게 죄송하다는 말씀을 드리며 업데이트 하겠습니다.

감사합니다.

최자윤 드림

성공전략이에요...퍼온글...

Success Strategies

성공 전략

Don’t Just Survive – Thrive!

단순한 생존이 아니라 번영을 쫓는다

Organized executives don’t measure success by the hours spent working. Success today is the time you spend doing what you want.

계획성 있는 지도자는 일하는 시간으로 성공을 가늠하지 않는다. 오늘날의 성공이란 자신이 원하는 바를 이룩하는 데에 쓰이는 시간이다.

You would be amazed by how relaxed some incredibly successful executives are, says Bill Dugan. But you’d be crazy to think they’re not organized.

몇몇의 성공하는 지도자들이 무척 여유로운 성격이라는 사실은 놀라운 일이라고 빌 듀간이 말한다. 그러나 이들이 그다지 계획적이지 않을 것이라는 생각은 금물이다.

Dugan should know. The original “Organized Executive” and publisher of a newsletter by the same name, Dugan’s newsletter doles out advice to senior-level professionals at some of the world’s top companies on how to accomplish more in less time. The readers are executives whose successful careers are matched only by their satisfying personal lives.

듀간은 알게 될 것이다. 한 뉴스레터를 창시한 “계획성 있는 지도자” 자신이자 출판인으로써 듀간의 뉴스레터는 짧은 시간에 얼마나 더 성취하는 지에 대해서 세계 정상급 회사의 수뇌급 전문인력의 좋은 지침서가 되고 있다. 주된 독자는 만족스러운 인생과 성공적인 커리어가 동시에 성취될 수 있어야 한다고 믿고 있다.

Consider Disney CEO Michael Eisner, who refuses to work late if he’s made a commitment to his children. Columbia TriStar Motion Pictures Vice Chairman Lucy Fisher, whose four-day schedule lets her dedicate Fridays to her family.

디즈니 최고 책임자 마이클 아이즈너는 아이들의 교육에 충실하기 위해 늦게까지 일하지 않는다고 한다. 콜롬비아 트리스타 영화사 부회장 루시 피스너는 주 4일 근무하며 매주 금요일은 가족과 함께 보낸다.

Telecommunications mogul John Malone, who works just five hours a day yet usually drives home for lunch. Even Jill Barad, Mattel’s hard-driving CEO and president, who ritualistically watches “ER” and “The X-Files” with her husband and sons.

통신시장의 거인 존 말론은 하루에 다섯 시간만 일하며 점심식사는 직접 운전하여 집에서 하기도 한다. 마텔의 정력적인 여성 다크호스 최고 총 책임자 질 바라드는 남편, 아들과 함께 예외 없이 “ER”과 “The X-Files”을 시청한다.

“All of these people have enormous responsibilities,” says Dugan from his Alexandria, Virginia, offices.

버지니아 알렉산드리아 사무실에서 듀간은 “이 모든 지도자가 막중한 임무를 띠고 있다”라고 말한다.

“Yet they find plenty of time for leisure, family, hobbies and other personal pursuits.” How do they do it? If you’re envisioning armies of personal assistants and nannies, think again.

“그러나 충분한 시간 동안 휴식을 취하며, 가족을 위하고, 취미생활이나 기타의 개인적인 사무에 시간을 보낸다.” 이들이 어떻게 이러한 일을 할 수 있는가? 그러나 개인비서나 유모를 모집하는 이에게는 이러한 사실은 꿈만 같은 일이다.

“These high achievers have mastered techniques that simplify their lives and make their work more efficient,” Dugan explains. “They’re in control of their lives, rather than the other way around.”

듀간은 “이러한 수뇌급의 인재는 삶과 일을 더욱더 효율적으로 단순화하는 기술을 숙지하였다”고 설명한다. “그들은 다른 사람들과는 달리 자신의 인생을 더 잘 통제할 수 있다.”

Increasingly, that sense of control is getting more elusive. Meetings, interruptions, deadlines; computer problems, staffing issues, information overload; travel schedules, towering files, unrelenting e-mails: Professionals today face a merciless toll of demands on their time.

점차적으로 이러한 통제의 의미는 더욱더 난해해져 간다. 모임, 간섭, 데드라인: 컴퓨터 문제, 스태프 이슈, 정보 과부하, 여행 스케쥴, 산더미 같은 파일, 쉴새 없이 보내오는 이메일… 오늘날 전문가는 무자비한 시대의 요구에 부응해야 한다.

And the situation is only worsening, as the global financial storm drifts onto American shores. For the first time in years, businesses are announcing layoffs, shortening work-weeks and instituting hiring freezes. Professionals must compete in an escalating race against time to do more with less. Effective time management has become an urgent priority for both workplace performance and personal sanity.

글로벌 파이낸스의 폭풍이 미국의 해변으로 물밀듯이 밀려오면서 시대는 더욱 악화될 뿐이다. 처음으로 비즈니스계에서 구조조정을 부르짖으며 근무시간을 단축하고 고용 구조를 변화시키고 있다. 전문인은 단시간에 적은 비용으로 경쟁사회에서 생존해야 한다. 효율적인 시간 경영은 작업장의 성적과 건강 모두를 충족시키기 위한 최선의 과제가 되었다.

Mastering the Balance:

균형잡기숙지:

Anyone can learn the methods that help superexecutives attain that delicate work-family balance, says Dugan. New productivity-enhancing techniques are outlined each month in his newsletter, The Organized Executive.

듀간은 일과 가족 사이에서 균형을 잡기 위해서 누구나 최고 수뇌급을 도와주는 방법을 터득할 수 있다고 말한다. “계획성 있는 지도자”라는 뉴스레터에서 새로운 생산성 증대 기술이 매달 요약정리 되어 있다.

Top performers, Dugan notes, reserve serious work for “prime time” when their energy level is at its peak. They get more from employees by using a system called “I-Power.” They quickly extinguish minor “fires” to prevent high-priority risks. They multiply their time with a strategy called “leveraging.” They rapidly process and filter vast amounts of information.

And, perhaps most important, they possess what he calls “the compulsion to closure.”

듀간은 수뇌급 지도자는 에너지 효율이 최고조일 때 프라임 타임으로 간주하며 어려운 과제를 해결하기도 한다. “I-Power”로 불리는 시스템을 이용하여 더욱 더 많은 고용인과 일을 더욱 잘 할 수 있다. 최고로 시급한 과제를 해결하기 위해서 중요하지 않은 불을 빠르게 끄게 된다. 레버리지라고 불리는 전략으로 시간적으로 여유를 가질 수 있다. 빠르게 일이 진전이 되며 수없이 많은 양의 정보가 걸러진다. 아마도 가장 중요한 사실은 휴식 시간을 스스로 결정할 수 있다는 능력을 가지고 있다는 것이다.

Dugan knows the solution for executives drowning in paper. “Paperwork presents a problem for almost everyone because it’s ubiquitous, and its onslaught is relentless,” he says.

Just as you’re about to clear the last bit of paper from your desk, the mail comes-or a stack of internal memos, or faxes, or a report or proposal to review-and a new bottleneck forms.

Simple, but ingenious, methods for tackling the hundreds of “micro decisions” facing professionals each day are revealed in The Organized Executive.

듀간은 종이와 싸움하는 지도자를 위한 솔루션을 알고 있다. “문서업무는 대부분의 사람에게 그다지 큰 호응을 받지 못한다. 그러한 업무가 주변에 수두룩하게 많으며 업무성격이 무척 호전적이며 가혹하기 때문이다.”고 듀간은 말한다.

책상에서 종이를 말끔히 청소하려고 하면 검토를 요하는 내부 회사 사원간의 메모, 팩스, 리포트, 프로젝트 제시서가 산더미 같이 밀려온다. 또한 병목현상도 두드러진다.

수도 없이 많은 하나 하나의 결정을 만들기 위해서 간단하지만 독창적인 방법을 꿈꾸는 전문인들에게 “계획성 있는 지도자”가 바로 좋은 해결책을 제공해 줄 수 있을 것이다.

Techniques like these aren’t rocket science, Dugan concedes. Mastering them doesn’t require extensive study-the 15 or so minutes it takes to read each issue of The Organized Executive is all it takes. But getting organized is more psychologically involving than you might think. It can unlock the door to greater professional satisfaction-even personal happiness.

듀간은 이러한 기술이 다그치는 기술이 되지 않는다고 결론 짓는다. 이러한 기술을 숙지하기 위해서 광범위한 커리큘럼을 마쳐야 하는 필요성이 요구되지 않는다. 15분 남짓한 시간에 “계획성 있는 지도자”의 이슈 하나 하나를 읽는 것이 전부이다. 그러나 더욱더 계획적으로 일을 하며 독자가 생각하기보다 심리적으로 자신을 완성할 수 있다. 더욱더 큰 전문가로서의 만족감과 개개인의 행복까지 성취할 수 있는 중요한 시기가 될 수 있다.

“So many people seem unhappy in their jobs,” Dugan explains.

“Relatively few connect that dissatisfaction to simple disorganization, which can make even good jobs unbearable, and which is relatively easy to correct.”

듀간은 “많은 사람들이 자신의 직장 생활을 불만족스럽게 보내고 있는 듯 하다”고 설명한다. “비교적 적은 수의 사람들이 자신의 직장생활을 견디기 힘들게 만들 수 있고 비교적 바꾸기 쉬운 습성으로 그들의 불만족스러움이 이렇게 단순한 무질서에서 비롯된다는 생각을 하지 못하고 있다.”

Case in point: Rosalie, executive director of a highly regarded nonprofit organization. Overwhelmed, overworked and exhausted, Rosalie “felt like she was losing it-she was forgetting important matters and considered quitting altogether.” A basic refresher course in organizing, “and within two weeks, Rosalie was back in the swing. It’s amazing,” Dugan muses, ‘how much job happiness rests on the simple routines that free us to direct more of our attention to what we really enjoy.”

핵심 케이스: 비영리 단체의 최고 책임자 로잘리.

당황스럽고 과로로 온몸이 노곤해 진 로잘리는 중대사를 잊어버리고 모두 포기하고 싶은 심정이었다. 계획적인 직장인을 위한 기본적인 수업 하나를 듣고 이주 후에 로잘리는 원상복귀에 성공하였다. 정말로 놀라울 따름이다.” 듀간은 ‘직장에서 얻는 행복감의 대부분이 사람들이 현실에서 즐겨 하는 단순한 루틴에서 비롯된다’는 사실을 강조한다.

Recapturing Time:

잃어버린 시간을 되찾는다:

The success stories are legion.

Most executives have advanced their careers, other have saved theirs-or their marriages-by learning how to cure procrastination, overcome workaholism, delegate decision-making, juggle projects or improve interpersonal relations, among other challenges.

성공 스토리는 무수히 많다. 대부분의 지도자는 우선적으로 일을 뒤로 미루는 습관 치료, 일 중독증 개선, 의사 결정 위임, 프로젝트 조작, 사람과 사람간의 관계를 개선시키는 방법을 터득하며 그들의 커리어를 더욱 발전시켰다.

Indeed, the reputation of The Organized executive has been growing since attracting tens of thousands of subscribers in the last six years. Most can probably afford one-on-one consulting fees, Dugan surmises. But they appreciate the newsletter’s concise and action-oriented nature.

“계획성 있는 지도자”에 대한 명망은 지난 6년 동안 수도 없이 많은 구독자에게 호응하며 성장해 왔다. 듀간은 대부분의 지도자가 1대1일 컨설팅 요금을 부담할 수 있을 것이라고 추측한다. 그러나 뉴스레터의 간결하며 참여를 유발하는 성격에 좋은 호응을 보인다.

They tend to like its price too.

At $297 for 12 issues, The Organized Executive costs a fraction of a $2,500-a-day consulting fee.

가격 또한 적합하다고 생각하는 경향이 있다. “계획성 있는 지도자” 12회분은 미화 297 달러로 하루 컨설팅 요금이 미화 2,500 달러가 부과된다는 사실과 비교해 무척 저렴하다.

Dugan is pleased by his readers’ reaction, but not surprised. “My aim is to show professionals how to get more done faster and recapture precious time for themselves.” What’s more, he adds, “A portfolio of productivity skills will serve you well anywhere. You gain self-confidence, self-reliance and a new sense of power and control over your destiny.”

듀간은 독자의 반응에 큰 기쁨을 느끼지만 그다지 놀라는 것은 아니다. “이룩하고자 하는 바는 전문인이 더욱 빠르게 업무를 수행하며 자신을 위해서 소중한 시간을 되찾는 방법을 보여주는 데에 있다.” 그는 다음과 같이 부가하기를, “생산성 기술의 포트폴리오는 어느 곳에서나 유요 적절하게 사용될 수 있으며 자신감, 위안감, 자신의 운명을 스스로 통제할 수 있고 새롭게 힘을 얻을 수 있다는 사실이 중요하다”고 한다.

Money-Back Offer:

환불 지급:

The publisher of The Organized Executive is so certain of his newsletter’s ability to help, he’s putting his money where his mouth is-if you don’t gain an extra hour each day, he’ll refund you the price you paid.

To subscribe, call ***-***-****.

“계획성 있는 지도자”의 출판인은 뉴스레터가 무척 유용하게 쓰이리라는 사실을 확신하고 있으며 주변의 투자자를 유치하고 있다 –매일 한 시간씩의 여유를 얻지 못하면 독자가 지불한 가격을 환불해 줄 것이다.

구독 신청은 ***-***-****에서 받습니다.

By George Hutchinson, Executive Focus

이그제큐티브 포커스의 조지 헛친슨

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It’s Not About Neatness:

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“Organization is not about neatness,” says Bill Dugan, America’s top publisher of material on organization and productivity. “It’s about a form of decision making involving every phone call, every number scribbled on a piece of paper, every item on your-to-do list.” Many of his subscribers are senior executives “who are very competent decision makers on a higher level, but they can’t get a handle on the hundreds of micro-decisions that face them each day.”

Dugan outlines dozens of tips for professional decision makers in each issue of The Organized Executive. Topics covered in recent issues include:

l How to take calculated risks

l How to juggle multiple priorities

l How to delegate like a pro

l How to make the most of the early-morning hours

l How to synchronize work-family scheduling

l How to capture great ideas that come at inopportune times

l How to ease back into work after vacation

l How to follow-up in a fool-proof manner

Shaking, Waking, and Which Dreamed It?

Your Red Majesty Shakes, Awakes and Dreams...

And it should not be allowed to pur, b/c it "really" was a kitten, after all...

Alice says, "Now, Kitty, let's consider who it was that dreamed it all. This is a serious question, my dear, and you should not go on licking your paw like that-as if Dinah hadn't washed you this morning! You see, Kitty, it must have been either me or the Red King. He was part of my dream, of course-but then I was part of his dream, too! Was it the Red King, Kitty? You were his wife, my dear, so you ought to know-Oh, Kitty, do help to settle it! I'm sure your paw can wait!"

The provoking kitten only embarked its journey to answering the question: which do you think it was?"

Alas, the original copy of the poem afterwards, which is as followed, looks pretty much real and simple for further early awakenings among its people around:

A BOAT, beneath a sunny sky
Lingering onward dreamily
In an evening of July-

Children three that nestle near,
Eager eye and willing ear,
Pleased a simple take to hear-

Long has paled that sunny sky:
Echoes fade and memories die:
Autumn fross have slain July.

Still she haunts me, phantomwise,
Alice moving under skies
Never seen by waking eyes.

Children yet, the tale to hear,
Eager eye and willing ear,
Lovingly shall nestle near.

In a Wonderland they lie,
Dreaming as the days go by,
Dreaming as the summers die:

Ever drifting down the stream-
Lingering in the golden gleam-
Life, what is it but a dream?

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If you like to kill innocent people around, calling for time and attention, you may be indicted under care of mom and dad...

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To all children who want to grow and develop,

Giving you my best wishes and lucks

A La Ja-Yoon Choi Inc.

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A smily face from a friend of mine--

She used to grow a flower in her garden, b/c she likes it.
Now she likes to buy a toad, a spider, a ladybug, cats and dogs,...
She likes to grow things around, b/c she likes it...

Many people like to grow and share things, b/c they like it.
Today, I like to grow my little pet and flowers and talk to mom and dad about them.

Animals and plants are my friends, and give me lots of good inspiration...

I like them and love them living with me together.

Wish people like them too.

:)

Easter Afterwards--

Have a happy easter!!!

Eggs are eggs, and only "good" eggs survive..........
!!!!!!
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<<<<<<<
>>>>>>>
!!!!!!
?????
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Microsoft Office Live Help

 

Microsoft Office Live Help

United Colors of Benetton Afterwards...

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Microcredit Africa Works...

 

In Africa molte persone vivono con meno di un dollaro al giorno.  Il microcredito permette ai piu' poveri di ottenere piccoli prestiti per costruirsi un futuro migliore.

--In Africa, many people live with less than a dollar a day.  Microcredito permits only a few poor people to obtain little money for being reborn into a lucky winner.

Il musicista Youssou N'Dour ha creato Birima, un programma di microcredito per il Senegal.  Benetton e' fiero di sostenere questo progetto.

--Youssou N'Dour, musician, created Birima, the program of microcredito for Senegal.  Benetton is fully supporting this project.

Per maggiori informazioni leggete colors 73: "Soldi", con un supplemento speciale dedicato a questa campagna e andate su www.benetton.com/africaworks per scaricare la canzone 'Birima' interpretata da Youssou N'Dour, Patti Smith, Irene Grandi, Francesco Renga e Simphiwe Dana.

--For general information, read colors 73: "money", with special dedicating supplement to this and go to www.benetton.com/africaworks for getting a song 'Birima', that is interpreted by Youssou N'Dour, Patti Smith, Irene Grandi, Francesco Renga and Simphiwe Dana.

www.benetton.com/africaworks

www.birima.org

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I have a real good family of mine on the side of my mother, who, strongly believes in having a good connection with the Red, or any part of the world et al...

They started smuggling into the world of fashion, however, not being able to survive, falling in pieces. 

My granny just collapsed and in her sick bed, probably dying soon.

I don't want any of buddies near me making the same mistake at home.  Can you kill them or what?

Just be patient and strong...

Labor Globalization Afterwards

Chapter 5 The Globalization of Labor

Over the past two decades, labor markets around the world have become increasingly integrated. Political changes and economic reforms have transformed China, India, and the formerEastern bloc countries, effectively involving theirlarge labor forces in open market economies.At the same time, the development of technology,combined with the progressive removal ofrestrictions on cross-border trade and capitalflows, has made it possible for production processesto be unbundled and located farther fromtarget markets for a growing universe of goodsand services. The location of production hasbecome much more responsive to relative laborcosts across countries. There have also beenincreasing flows of migrants across borders,through both legal and informal routes.This ongoing globalization of the labormarket has drawn increasing attention frompolicymakers and the media, particularly in theadvanced economies. The most asked questionis whether the addition of this unprecedentedlylarge pool of labor from emerging marketand developing countries is adversely affectingcompensation and employment in the advancedeconomies.This chapter addresses this important andemotive question. In contrast with most previousstudies, which focus on one country ora single channel of transmission, it takes abroad approach, considering a large sample ofadvanced economies and a full range of transmissionchannels (competing imports of finalproducts, offshoring of intermediate products,and immigration). The chapter focuses on thefollowing issues:• How rapidly has the global labor supplygrown, and which channels of labor globalizationhave been most important?• To what extent can recent trends in laborshares and labor compensation in advancedeconomies be explained by the changingglobal labor supply relative to other factorssuch as technological change and labor marketreform? Has the impact been different inskilled and unskilled sectors?• What policies can help the advanced economiesmeet the challenges of further labormarket globalization?This chapter finds that the effective globallabor force has risen fourfold over the pasttwo decades. This growing pool of global laboris being accessed by advanced economiesthrough various channels, including importsof final goods, offshoring of the production ofintermediates, and immigration. The ongoingglobalization of labor has contributed to risinglabor compensation in advanced economies byboosting productivity and output, while emergingmarket countries have also benefited fromrising wages. Nevertheless, globalization is oneof several factors that have acted to reduce theshare of income accruing to labor in advancedeconomies, although rapid technological changehas had a bigger impact, especially on workersin unskilled sectors. The analysis finds thatcountries that have enacted reforms to lowerthe cost of labor to business and improve labormarket flexibility have generally experienceda smaller decline in the labor income share.Looking ahead, it is important for countries tomaximize the benefits from labor globalizationand technological change, while also working toaddress the distributional impact. To this end,policies should seek to improve the functioningof labor markets; strengthen access to educationand training; and ensure adequate social safetynets that cushion the impact on those adverselyNote: The main authors of this chapter are FlorenceJaumotte and Irina Tytell, with support from Christian deGuzman and Stephanie Denis. Robert Feenstra providedconsultancy support.CHA PTER 5 The Globalization of Labor162affected, without obstructing the process ofadjustment.How Globalized Is Labor?A first question to address is how the openingup of China, India, and the former Eastern bloccountries, together with ongoing demographicdevelopments, has affected the global laborsupply. This is not easy to answer because muchdepends on the assumptions made about howmuch of a country’s labor force is in, or couldpotentially compete in, the global market. Onesimple approach is to weigh each country’slabor force by its export-to-GDP ratio. Bythis measure, the effective global labor supplyquadrupled between 1980 and 2005, with mostof the increase taking place after 1990 (Figure5.1). East Asia contributed about half ofthe increase, due to a marked rise in workingagepopulation and rising trade openness, whileSouth Asia and the former Eastern bloc countriesaccounted for smaller increases. Whilemost of the absolute increase in the globallabor supply consisted of less-educated workers(defined as those without higher education), therelative supply of workers with higher educationincreased by about 50 percent over the last 25years, owing mostly to advanced economies, butalso to China.Advanced economies can access this increasedpool of global labor both through imports ofgoods and services and through immigration.Trade has been the more important channeland has grown more rapidly, not least becauseThis approach, which follows Harrigan and Balaban(1999), is more accurate for developing countries specializedin labor-intensive activities than for advanced economieswhose exports are relatively capital intensive. Inorder to capture the export of labor through emigration,emigration weights could be added to the trade weights.However, these weights are generally very small.This compares to estimates in Freeman (2006) thatthe integration of China, India, and the former Easternbloc countries doubled the number of workers in theglobal economy. The difference is due to the weighingof national labor forces by export-to-GDP ratios in thischapter’s estimates.Figure 5.1. Alternative Measures of Global Labor SupplyEast Asia's marked rise in working-age population and increasing trade opennesshave contributed to about half of the quadrupling of the effective global laborsupply, while South Asia and the former Eastern bloc accounted for smallerincreases.1980 85 90 95 2000 05050100150200250300350Global Labor Supply 400(index, 1980 = 100)Working-agepopulationLabor forceExport-weightedlabor force1Sources: United Nations, Population Prospects: The 2004 Revision Population database;World Bank, World Development Indicators; and IMF staff calculations.National labor forces scaled by export-to-GDP ratios.Includes Western Hemisphere, Middle East and North Africa, and sub-Saharan Africa.More educated labor force is defined by persons with university-level education. Lesseducated is defined by labor force with primary and secondary education plus theuneducated.1231980 85 90 95 2000 050200400600800Export-Weighted Labor Force by Region 1000(index, 1980 = 100)11980 85 90 95 2000 0502505007501000125015001980 85 90 95 2000 050102030405060Working-Age Population 70by Region (millions ofpeople)Non-Oil Export-to-GDP Ratio byRegion (percent)1980 85 90 95 2000 050100200300400500600700Export-Weighted Global Labor Force by Education Level 800(millions of people)1, 3More educatedLess educatedAdvanced economiesEast AsiaSouth AsiaCentral and Eastern Europe andCommonwealth of IndependentStatesOther developing countries2immigration remains highly restricted in mostcountries (Figure 5.2). A similar picture emergesfor developing and emerging market countries,where the export-to-GDP ratio is in generalmuch higher than the ratio of emigrants to thedomestic labor force. Nevertheless, immigrationhas expanded significantly over the pasttwo decades in some large European economies(Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom) andin the United States. The share of immigrants inthe U.S. labor force is now close to 15 percentand hence comparable to the share of importsin GDP. Elsewhere the share of immigrants isstill substantially less than the share of importsin GDP, but it is not negligible.Focusing on trade, the share of developingcountry products in the manufacturing importsof advanced economies has doubled since theearly 1990s (Figure 5.3). This owes much toChina. Developing countries have also beencapturing an increasing share of world markets.At the aggregate level, however, trade is awin-win game. As China, India, and the Easternbloc countries have opened up, world marketsand opportunities to export have expandedconsiderably for advanced economies anddevelopingcountries alike. Developing countries’imports have been growing faster thanthose of advanced economies and the share ofadvanced economies’ exports going to developingcountries has been rising (though not asrapidly as the share of developing countries intheir own imports). Further, while both importand export prices have been on a decliningtrend relative to output prices, the terms oftrade of advanced economies have improved bya cumulative 7 percent since 1980. Most notably,there was a substantial improvement in theterms of trade of Japan in the first half of the1980s. However, the large fall in import pricesat this time was mainly the result of the strongappreciation of the yen at a time when oil priceswere falling, and was not directly related toglobalization.The stock of emigrants is limited to those emigratingto OECD economies.Figure 5.2. Immigration and Trade(Percent of labor force and GDP, respectively)0510152025303540451990 2005Advanced EconomiesImports of goodsand servicesImmigration2Developing Countries051015202530354045Exports of goodsand servicesEmigration211980 85 90 95 200005101520Stock of Foreign Labor Force in Advanced Economies 25(percent of total labor force)31980 85 90 95 2000 05010203040Imports of Goods and Services in Advanced Economies 50(percent of GDP)Sources: Docquier and Marfouk (2005); OECD, International Migration Data; U.S.Census Bureau; and IMF staff calculations.2000 data for immigration and emigration.Hong Kong SAR, Greece, Israel, New Zealand, Singapore, and Taiwan Province ofChina are not included in average immigration due to data limitations. Russia andSlovak Republic are not included in average emigration due to data limitations.Foreign-born labor force for Australia, Canada, and the United States. For Italy,the Netherlands, Norway, and the United Kingdom, the data refer to the share of foreignemployment in total employment.12304Although immigration has expanded significantly over the past two decades insome large European countries and the United States, trade remains as the moreimportant channel for accessing the large global labor force.United StatesUnited KingdomJapanGermanyFranceItalyCanadaHow Globalized Is Labor?163CHA PTER 5 The Globalization of Labor164As can be seen in Figure 5.4, the strongexport dynamism of emerging market and developingcountries is in skilled as well as unskilledproducts: developing countries’ share in worldexports of skilled goods and services has beenon the rise in recent years. China has led theway, reflecting its very strong growth and a movetoward more skill-intensive goods in its exportbasket. India’s export basket is also changingrapidly toward skill-intensive services, but thecountry’s weight in world trade remains small.One category of trade that has received muchattention in recent years is trade in intermediates.The reduction of barriers to cross-bordertrade and capital flows, combined with technologicalprogress in transport and communication,has made it easier for firms to moveparts of their production to less costly foreignlocations—a process referred to as offshoreoutsourcing or, more simply, offshoring. Nevertheless,and contrary to some popular perceptions,offshored inputs, which account for abouthalf of total imports (the rest being imports offinal products), have grown somewhat moreslowly than total trade (see also OECD, 2006a).Moreover, the scale of offshoring is still quitelimited in the overall economy (Figure 5.5).Imports of intermediate manufacturing andservices inputs (excluding energy) accountedfor about 5 percent of gross output and about10 percent of total intermediate inputs inadvanced economies in 2003, the latest year forwhich data are available. These shares haveSkilled exports are measured as exports of goods andservices produced in skilled sectors, that is, sectors with ahigher share of skilled workers in their labor force. Theresults are generally robust to excluding medium-skill sectorsand focusing instead on low-skill and high-skill sectors(see Appendix 5.1 for details). Using a more refinedclassification of products by skill intensity, Rodrik (2006)concludes that China’s export basket is much more skillintensive than would be expected given China’s level ofdevelopment.It is common to scale imported intermediates bytotal intermediate inputs to estimate the intensity ofoffshoring. However, it seems more appropriate to scaleimported intermediates by total inputs (including laborand capital), since imported intermediates can substitutenot only for domestic intermediate inputs but also forin-house labor and capital.1980 85 90 95 2000 05608010012014016018020080859095100105110115Ratio of Import and Export Price Deflators to Total Absorption 120Deflator, Advanced OECD Economies (index, 2000 = 100)Export price deflator(left scale) Terms of trade(right scale)Import price deflator(left scale)Non-oil terms of trade(right scale)1990 92 94 96 98 2000 02 0402040608010002468Manufacturing Imports of Advanced OECD Economies by Source 10(percent of total)Other advanced economies (left scale)Developing countries (left scale)China (right scale)India (right scale)1990 92 94 96 98 2000 02 0402040608010002468Manufacturing Exports of Advanced OECD Economies by Destination 10(percent of total)India (right scale)China (right scale)Other advanced economies (left scale)Developing countries(left scale)As China, India, and the Eastern bloc have opened up, world markets andopportunities to export have expanded considerably for advanced economies anddeveloping countries alike.Figure 5.3. Share of Developing Countries in TradeSources: OECD, STAN Bilateral Trade Database; and IMF staff calculations.1985 90 95 2000 05010203040501985 90 95 2000 05010203040Imports of Developing 50Countries (percent ofadvanced economies'imports)Non-oil goodsServicesExports of DevelopingCountries (percent ofadvanced economies'exports) Non-oil goodsServicesincreased only moderately since the early 1980s.The share of offshored inputs in gross outputranges from 12 percent in the Netherlands toabout 2–3 percent in the United States andJapan. Offshoring is thus relatively limitedin the United States and Japan, in the sameway that trade openness is usually low in largeeconomies.The manufacturing sector has been mostaffected by offshoring because it is more tradable.For the countries for which long dataseries are available (G-7, Australia, and the Netherlands),the share of imported manufacturinginputs in gross manufacturing output increasedfrom 6 percent in 1980 to 10 percent in 2003,with the rise being somewhat stronger in the latteryears of the sample (Figure 5.6). In 2003, theoffshoring intensity in manufacturing rangedfrom 4 percent in Japan to a high of about25 percent in Canada. Imports of services inputsby the overall economy remain low at 1 percentof gross output, although the offshoring intensityin services has increased in recent years in anumber of countries, including Canada, Germany,and the Netherlands.Interestingly, the rise in offshoring inadvanced economies has been driven mostly byimports of skilled rather than unskilled inputs.Several factors may help explain this finding.First, in line with advanced economies’ comparativeadvantage in skill-intensive production,goods traditionally produced in unskilled sectors(e.g., textiles) are more likely to be imported asfinal goods rather than intermediates. Sectorsinvolved in the rise in the imports of intermediariesare electronic equipment; other machineryand equipment; and chemical, rubber, andplastic products. It should be noted, however,The flattening in 2001–02 is temporary and reflectsthe slowdown in world trade associated with the globalrecession.See Jensen and Kletzer (2005) and Amiti and Wei(2005) for more details on offshoring of services. Thelatter also find that offshoring of services remains verylimited, although it has grown in recent years.The share of imported intermediates in total imports ofunskilled products is lower than the comparable share forskilled products, at 37 percent and 68 percent, respectively.1992 94 96 98 2000 02 040102030405060701995 96 97 98 99 2000 01 02 0305101520253035Figure 5.4. Developing Countries: Exports of SkilledManufacturing Goods and Services(Percent)As a Share of Advanced Economies' Skilled ExportsChinaIndiaSouth AfricaPolandBrazilEmerging EuropeSources: OECD, International Trade in Services Database and STAN IndustrialDatabase; World Bank, World Integrated Trade Solution database; and IMF, Balance ofPayments Statistics.Bangladesh, China, India, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand.Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovak Republic, and Turkey.Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru, and Venezuela.Egypt, Ethiopia, Morocco, South Africa, Sudan, and Tanzania.12341992 94 96 98 2000 02 04020406080100ChinaIndiaSouth AfricaPolandBrazilAs a Share of Country's Total Exports in ManufacturingAs a Share of Country's Total Exports in ServicesThe recent robust growth in developing countries' share in world exports, particularlyin skilled products, owes much to China.Developing countriesDeveloping AsiaLatin America1 Middle East and Africa234How Globalized Is Labor?165CHA PTER 5 The Globalization of Labor166that offshoring is likely to involve the least skill-intensivestages of production in these skilledsectors, although the available data do notallow confirmation of this. Second, the bulk ofadvanced economies’ imports (of both final andintermediate products) still comes from otheradvanced economies and likely includes moreskilled rather than unskilled products. Third,as mentioned earlier, the global supply of laborwith higher education has increased relative tolabor with lower education.How Has the Globalization of LaborAffected Workers in Advanced Economies?The rapid growth of the global labor supplyand its manifestation through increasing exportsof emerging market and developing countriesleads to the question of how these trends haveaffected workers in advanced economies. Withexports from emerging market and developingcountries being intensive in labor, especiallyunskilled labor, traditional trade theory wouldpredict that the integration of these countriesinto the world economy would exert downwardpressure on the wages (corrected for productivity)of workers in advanced economies. Hence,the share of national income received by labor—the so-called labor share—would be expectedto decline. To see this, it is worth noting thatthe labor share can be expressed as the ratioof labor compensation per worker to averageworker productivity.Nevertheless, workers in advanced economiescould still be better off if the positive effectsfrom enhanced trade and productivity on theeconomy’s income (the size of the total “pie”)are larger than the negative effect on the shareof this income that accrues to labor. The vastliterature documenting gains from trade (see,for example, Lewer and Van den Berg, 2003;Berg and Krueger, 2003) suggests that theincrease in the economy’s income may indeedbe substantial. Recently, Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2006) have argued that the productivity-enhancingeffect from trade in intermediatescould be even larger than from trade in final1980 85 90 95 2000036912Total Offshoring in Advanced OECD Economies 15(weighted; percent)Figure 5.5. Offshoring by Advanced EconomiesThe extent of offshoring is still quite limited in advanced economies. In 2003, theoffshoring of nonenergy manufacturing and services inputs averaged about 5percent of gross output and roughly 10 percent of total intermediate inputs. The lowlevel of offshoring is particularly pronounced in the world's largest economies, theUnited States and Japan.1970 75 80 85 90 95 2000036912Total Offshoring in G-7 Economies 15(percent of gross output)Italy CanadaUnited StatesUnited KingdomFranceGermanyJapanSources: OECD, Input-Output Tables (1995, 2002, and 2006 editions), International Tradein Services Database, and STAN Industrial Database; Groningen Growth and DevelopmentCentre, 60-Industry Database (September 2006); and IMF staff calculations.Offshoring measures calculated using Input-Output Tables from OECD; resulting seriesextended from 2001 to 2003 by estimating extent of offshoring using a combination of datafrom the OECD STAN Industrial Database and the Groningen 60-Industry Database; onlyoffshoring of nonenergy manufacturing and services inputs considered.Advanced OECD economies used in calculations for long time series include Australia,Canada, France, Germany, Japan, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and the UnitedStates; weighted using series on GDP at current U.S. dollars from the World EconomicOutlook database.Advanced OECD economies used in calculations for short time series include Australia,Austria, Canada, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Japan, Korea,Portugal, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States; weighted using serieson GDP at current U.S. dollars from the World Economic Outlook database.1231985 90 95 2000304050607080Total Offshoring in G-7 Economies(percent of total imports of manufacturing goods and services)United StatesUnited KingdomFranceGermanyJapanShare of gross output (long time series)Share of gross output (short time series)Share of total intermediate inputs (long time series)Share of total intermediate inputs (short time series)23231goods because, in addition to a competitioneffect for producing sectors, trade in intermediatesalso reduces the costs of production of usingsectors. The empirical evidence on the productivityeffects of offshoring is, however, mixed.What do the data show? Looking first at thelabor share, there has been a clear decline sincethe early 1980s across the advanced economies(Figure 5.7).10 The decline is stronger for thelabor share than for the share of employees’compensation, reflecting a reduction in theshare of other categories of workers in thetotal workforce (other categories of workersinclude self-employed, employers, and familyworkers).11 A part of this decline is a reversalof the rise in labor shares that took placein the 1970s, especiallyin Europe and Japan(Blanchard, 1998).12There is little empirical evidence on the productivityeffects of offshoring to date (see Olsen, 2006). Thereare some indications that positive productivity effectsof manufacturing offshoring depend on the degree towhich firms are already globally engaged. However, theirglobal engagement may be already close to optimal levelsin advanced economies, suggesting that the potential forproductivity gains from services offshoring may be larger.Positive productivity effects of services offshoring to dateappear to be generally small in manufacturing plants, butsomewhat bigger in service-sector firms. Amiti and Wei(2006) find a significant positive effect of services offshoringand a somewhat smaller positive effect of manufacturingoffshoring on productivity in the United States.10National accounts provide the share of employees’compensation in total income but do not identify separatelythe labor income of other categories of workers(self-employed, employers, and family workers). Severalcorrection procedures are available (Gollin, 2002) and,for data availability reasons, the employees’ compensationwas augmented with compensation of other categoriesof workers by assuming that the latter command similarwages per worker as employees. The results are robust ifother procedures are used (see Appendix 5.1).11Focusing on the United States, for which data areavailable since 1930, the share of employees’ compensationin national income does not appear to be at a historicallow (though this may be partly related to the risein the share of employees in the total workforce).12Blanchard (1998) argues that the rise of the laborshare in Europe in the 1970s was driven by a negativeshift in labor supply as wages did not adjust fast enoughto the slowdown in underlying factor productivity growth.Over time, though, employment adjusted downward,exerting downward pressure on wages and returning thelabor share toward its previous level (though at a higherunemployment rate). The further decline that has taken1980 85 90 95 20000510152025Offshoring of Manufacturing Inputs by the Manufacturing Sector 30(weighted; percent of manufacturing gross output)Figure 5.6. Advanced Economies: Offshoringby Category of Inputs1The manufacturing sector has been more affected by offshoring because it is moretradable, although there are considerable differences across countries (the verticalline shows the range of country outcomes). Skilled inputs have also played a moresignificant role in the growth of offshoring in advanced economies than unskilledinputs.Weighted average Range of country outcomes1980 85 90 95 20000123Offshoring of Services Inputs 4(weighted; percent of gross output)21980 85 90 95 20000123Offshoring of Unskilled and Skilled Inputs 4(weighted; percent of gross output)UnskilledSkilledSources: OECD, Input-Output Tables (1995, 2002, and 2006), International Trade inServices Database, and STAN Industrial Database; Groningen Growth and DevelopmentCentre, 60-Industry Database (September 2006); and IMF staff calculations.Offshoring measures calculated using Input-Output Tables from OECD; resulting seriesextended from 2001 to 2003 by estimating extent of offshoring using a combination of datafrom the OECD's STAN Industrial Database and the Groningen 60-Industry Database; onlyoffshoring of nonenergy manufacturing and services inputs considered. Advanced OECDeconomies used in calculations for long time series include Australia, Canada, France,Germany, Japan, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and the United States; weightedusing series on GDP at current U.S. dollars from the World Economic Outlook database.Excludes the United States since import data are reported as inclusive of "cost,insurance, and freight"; thus, values that normally accrue to business services are includedin associated goods sectors.12How Has the Globalization of Labor Affected Workers in Advanced Economies?167CHA PTER 5 The Globalization of Labor168The decline in the labor share since 1980has been much more pronounced in Europeand Japan (about 10 percentage points) thanin Anglo-Saxon countries, including the UnitedStates (about 3–4 percentage points).13 WithinEurope, the strongest decline is observed in Austria,Ireland, and the Netherlands. Further, mostof the decline in the labor share can be attributedto the fall in unskilled sectors, which wasmore pronounced in Europe and Japan than inthe Anglo-Saxon countries. This decline reflectsa combination of the reduction in the withinsectorlabor share and the shift of output fromunskilled toward skilled sectors (see Figure 5.7).The income share of labor in skilled sectors, onthe other hand, has been on the rise, especiallyin Anglo-Saxon countries where it has increasedby about 5 percentage points. It is important toemphasize that due to the nature of the availabledata, these results relate to income sharesof workers in skilled and unskilled sectors,rather than to income shares of skilled andunskilled workers themselves.Despite the fall in the overall labor share, reallabor compensation has expanded robustly inall advanced economies since 1980, with growthaccelerating since the mid-1990s. This trendreflects both employment growth and increasesin real compensation per worker, with a strongerweight on employment in the Anglo-Saxoncountries and on real compensation per workerin Europe (Figure 5.8). Since the mid-1990s,however, employment growth has picked up inEurope, outpacing the growth in real compensationper worker. Growth in labor compensationof unskilled sectors, however, has been very sluggish(Figure 5.9). While unskilled employmenthas held steady in the United States, increasesplace in the labor share since the mid-1980s is the resultof an adverse labor demand shock: at a given wage andcapital stock, firms have steadily decreased employment.Such a shift may have various sources: the adoption oftechnologies biased against labor and toward capital or ashift in the distribution of rents away from workers.13For the purpose of this chapter, Europe includes theeuro area countries, Denmark, and Norway, while Anglo-Saxon countries include Australia, Canada, the UnitedKingdom, and the United States.Figure 5.7. Advanced Economies: Labor Income Shares(Percent of GDP unless otherwise noted)Over the past two decades, there has been a continued decline in the share ofincome that accrues to labor, especially in Europe and Japan. The income share ofworkers in unskilled sectors has dropped strongly while that of workers in skilledsectors has generally made small gains.United Sates EuropeOther Anglo-Saxon4 Japan51930 45 60 75 90 2005455055606570751980 85 90 95 2000 0545505560657075Income Share of Labor byGroup of CountriesHistorical U.S. Income Shareof Employees1970 75 80 85 90 95 2000 05455055606570751980 84 88 92 96 2000 0445505560657075 G-7 Economies(weighted)Advanced Economies(weighted)3Income share of employees1 Income share of labor2in real compensation per worker have beenmeager in unskilled sectors and the earningsgap between skilled and unskilled sectors haswidened by 25 percent. In Europe, real compensationper worker in unskilled sectors grewbroadly in line with that in skilled sectors, butemployment in unskilled sectors lost groundto employment in skilled sectors (and actuallycontracted by a cumulative 15 percent).14Turning to emerging market countries, theorywould predict that the globalization of laborwould bring large benefits for workers in theform of wage convergence toward the levels inadvanced economies. Data from the manufacturingsector confirm that real wages in emergingmarket countries, particularly in Asia, have beencatching up with those in the United States(Figure 5.10). Real wages (corrected for purchasingpower) have been converging rapidly andare relatively high in Asian countries that starteddeveloping earlier (Hong Kong SAR, Korea, Singapore,and Taiwan Province of China). Wagesin other Asian countries, including China, havebeen converging at a slower pace, though this hasaccelerated in recent years.15 Studies confirm thatboth trade and emigration have contributed torising incomes of nationals of developing countries,although the evidence on their impact oninequality is mixed (see Box 5.1 for a discussionof the evidence on the implications of globalizationfor labor markets in developing countries).Labor Compensation and the Globalization ofLabor: An Empirical ExaminationWhile striking, the globalization of labor isbut one of the forces that has been affecting thelabor markets of advanced economies over thepast two decades. Rapid technological changeis another central development with potentiallyimportant implications for labor market14Katz and Autor (1999) find similar changes in thegap between high- and low-income earners for the UnitedStates and European countries.15Asia’s labor productivity has also been convergingtoward the U.S. level (see the September 2006 WorldEconomic Outlook).1980 85 90 95 2000152025303540451980 85 90 95 200015202530354045Income Share of Labor inUnskilled Sectors(percent of economy-widevalue added)Income Share of Labor inSkilled Sectors(percent of economy-widevalue added)Income Share of Labor WithinUnskilled Sectors(percent of unskilled sectors'value added)1980 85 90 95 200050556065707580851980 85 90 95 20005055606570758085Income Share of Labor WithinSkilled Sectors(percent of skilled sectors'value added)United States EuropeOther Anglo-Saxon4 Japan5Figure 5.7 (concluded)Sources: Haver Analytics; International Labor Organization, Labor Statistics Database; OECD,Employment and Labor Market Statistics, National Accounts Statistics, and STAN IndustrialDatabase; United Nations, National Accounts Statistics (2004); and IMF staff calculations.Income share of employees is the ratio of employees' labor compensation to value added.The income share of labor estimates the share of labor compensation of employees and"nonemployee" workers in value added.Advanced economies include Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France,Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, the UnitedKingdom, and the United States; weighted using series on GDP in U.S. dollars from the WorldEconomic Outlook database.Anglo-Saxon economies include Australia, Canada, and the United Kingdom. Australia isexcluded from the analysis by skill level due to lack of data.Europe includes Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, theNetherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, and Sweden. Ireland, the Netherlands, and Spain areexcluded from the analysis by skill level due to lack of data.5432 1How Has the Globalization of Labor Affected Workers in Advanced Economies?169CHA PTER 5 The Globalization of Labor170outcomes (Figure 5.11 ). The information andcommunications technology (ICT) revolution, anall-purpose technological revolution that Blinder(2006) has compared to the third industrial revolution,has stimulated capital accumulation (seethe September 2001 World Economic Outlook) andfavored skilled labor—with which it is more complementary—over unskilled labor. Technologyhas also progressed in other areas as reflected inthe strong rise in patent applications in OECDeconomies, especially since the early 1 990s.There have also been changes in labor andproduct market policies. Reforms have proceededin several areas, but generally in thedirection of lowering the cost of labor to businessand enhancing the flexibility of markets. Fourmain developments in labor market policies areparticularly worth noting (see Figure 5.11 ): (1) amarked increase in the generosity of unemploymentbenefits in Europe (as measured by averagereplacement rate of income), in contrast witha slight decline in Anglo-Saxon countries; (2) ageneral decline in the tax wedge, especially inthe United States where it has fallen by about10 percentage points since 1 995; (3) substantialdeclines in legislated employment protection andproduct market regulation, especially in Europeand Japan, both of which started with particularlyrestrictive stances; and (4) persisting large crosscountrydifferences in the degree of employmentprotection, with low protection in the UnitedStates and other Anglo-Saxon countries andrelatively high protection in Europe and Japan.Recent studies (Bassanini and Duval, 2006; andAnnett, 2006) have highlighted reductions in thetax wedge, reductions in unemployment benefits,deregulation of product markets, and more limitedemployment protection as the main factorsthat have contributed to employment growthand declining unemployment.16 Disentangling16Some of these variables may also affect the laborshare in similar ways, especially if the elasticity of substitutionbetween labor and capital is high. For instance, anincrease in the unemployment benefit replacement rateincreases the reservation wage of workers and leads in thevery short run to a rise in the labor share. But as employmentadjusts downward, the labor share declines and canFigure 5.8. Advanced Economies: Labor Compensationand Employment(Index, 1980 = 100)Real total laborcompensationReal labor compensationper workerEmploymentDespite the fall in the overall labor share, real labor compensation has grownrobustly in advanced economies, with a stronger weight on employment inAnglo-Saxon economies.Sources: Haver Analytics; International Labor Organization, Labor Statistics Database;OECD, Employment and Labor Market Statistics, National Accounts Statistics, and STANIndustrial Database; United Nations, National Accounts Statistics (2004); and IMF staffcalculations.Advanced economies include Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland,France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden,the United Kingdom, and the United States; weighted using series on GDP in U.S. dollarsfrom the World Economic Outlook database.Anglo-Saxon economies include Australia, Canada, and the United Kingdom.Europe includes Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy,the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, and Sweden.1231980 85 90 95 2000 05801001201401601802001980 85 90 95 2000 0580100120140160180Advanced Economies United States 200(weighted)11980 85 90 95 2000 0580100120140160180Europe3 2001980 85 90 95 2000 0580100120140160180200 Other Anglo-Saxon21980 85 90 95 2000 0580100120140160180200 Japanthe influence of these variables is difficult, inparticular because technological change and theglobalization of labor may be expected to affectcompensation and the labor share in similarways. The influence of policy variables is complex,particularly because they may also affect thelabor share indirectly by facilitating or obstructingthe adjustment of the economy to laborglobalization and technological progress.This section uses an econometric model toanalyze the relationship between labor compensationand labor globalization—measuredin terms-of-trade prices, offshoring, andimmigration—controlling for technologicalprogress and changes in labor market policies.The basic model, which has solid microeconomicfoundations and is widely used in the recenttrade literature (see, for instance, Feenstra, 2004;Harrigan, 1998; and Kohli, 1991), relates thelabor share to the capital-labor ratio and importand export prices (expressed relative to domesticprices).17 The two latter variables capturethe effects of globalization of trade: declinesin import prices are expected to decrease thelabor share, as imports that come increasinglyfrom developing countries are labor intensive; incontrast, declines in export prices should benefitlabor relative to capital because of the highcapital intensity of advanced economies’ exports.The basic model is augmented to include theintensity of offshoring, the share of immigrantsin the domestic labor force, the share of ICTcapital in total capital, measures of labor marketpolicies, and country fixed effects.18 The modelfall below its initial level if the elasticity of substitutionbetween capital and labor is high enough (Blanchard,1998). Other shocks that increase the cost of labor, such asan increase in the tax wedge or an increase in employmentprotection, can be expected to have similar effects.Although strict product market regulation creates rents, itis not clear that it should affect the distribution of theserents between labor and capital and hence the labor share.17The factor share equations are derived from the maxi-mization of an (economy-wide) revenue function, taking asgiven the factor endowments and sectoral prices (import,export, and absorption). See Appendix 5.1 for more details.18The theoretical rationale for including these variablesis that they may act as shift factors in the revenue (GNP)function (Feenstra, 2004).Despite strong growth of labor compensation overall, the growth in laborcompensation of unskilled sectors has been very slow. In the United States, theearnings gap between skilled and unskilled workers has widened by about 25 percentsince 1980, while in Europe, employment in unskilled sectors has contracted.1980 85 90 95 200090100110120130140150160Labor Compensation in Unskilled Sectors (weighted)1 170Figure 5.9. Advanced Economies: Labor Compensationand Employment in Skilled and Unskilled Sectors(Index, 1980 = 100)Real total laborcompensationReal labor compensationper workerEmploymentOther Anglo-Saxon2 JapanUnited States Europe 3Sources: Haver Analytics; International Labor Organization, Labor Statistics Database;OECD, Employment and Labour Market Statistics, National Accounts Statistics, and STANIndustrial Database; United Nations, National Accounts Statistics (2004); and IMF staffcalculations.For analysis by skill level, advanced economies include Austria, Belgium, Canada,Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, the UnitedKingdom, and the United States; weighted using series on GDP in U.S. dollars from theWorld Economic Outlook database.For analysis by skill level, Anglo-Saxon economies include Canada and the UnitedKingdom.For analysis by skill level, Europe includes Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France,Germany, Italy, Norway, Portugal, and Sweden.1231980 85 90 95 2000901001101201301401501601701980 85 90 95 200090100110120130140150160Index of Skilled to Unskilled 170EmploymentIndex of Skilled to UnskilledReal Labor Compensationper Worker1980 85 90 95 200080901001101201301401980 85 90 95 20008090100110120130140 Index of Unskilled Real LaborCompensation per WorkerIndex of Unskilled EmploymentHow Has the Globalization of Labor Affected Workers in Advanced Economies?171CHA PTER 5 The Globalization of Labor172was estimated on a panel of 18 advanced OECDeconomies over 1982–2002, for the overalllabor share and for the income shares of laborin skilled and unskilled sectors (see Appendix5.1 for more details). At the outset, it shouldbe noted that the effects of globalization canonly be imperfectly disentangled from those oftechnology, especially for technological progressin transport and communication, whichvastly expands the opportunities for globalizedproduction. Similarly, part of the decline inimport (and, in some cases, export) prices maybe attributable to productivity improvements inthe production of information and communicationstechnology.The results from estimating this modelsuggest that labor globalization, technologicalchange, and labor market policies have allaffected labor shares over the past two decades(Figure 5.12).19 Both labor globalization andtechnological progress have acted to reduce thelabor share, with the impact of technologicalprogress being somewhat larger, while changesin labor market policies have generally had asmaller but positive impact on the labor share.2019The contribution of a factor to the average annualchange in the labor share over the sample period is theproduct of its coefficient and of its own average annualchange over the same period.20Most studies have focused on explaining the declinein the relative wage (or labor share) of unskilled workersin the United States (see Freeman, 1995; and Feenstra,2004, for a survey). Studies that attempt to explain theevolution of the overall labor share are more scarce.Most studies conclude that skill-biased technologicalchange is a more important cause of wage inequalitythan trade (e.g., Harrigan, 1998; and Harrigan andBalaban, 1999). Feenstra (2004 and 2007) finds thatthe role of trade and technological progress are equallyimportant in explaining rising wage inequality. In arecent contribution, Guscina (2006) finds that laborshares across countries are equally affected by technologicalprogress and openness. Harrison (2002) alsofinds that globalization tends to reduce the labor share.Another strand of the literature examines whetherglobalization increases the elasticity of labor demand towages and finds mixed results (see, for instance, Slaughter,2001; and OECD, 2006a). Studies of immigrationtend to find that its effects on wages and employment ofnatives are small (Greenwood, Hunt, and Kohli, 1996;and OECD, 2006b).Figure 5.10. Catch-Up by Emerging Markets'Manufacturing Wages(Percent of U.S. manufacturing wages in constant PPP dollars)Sources: UNIDO, Industrial Statistics Database (2006); CEIC Asia Database; InstitutoBrasileiro de Geografia e Estatística, Pesquisa Industrial Mensal; and IMF staff calculations.1970 75 80 85 90 95 2000010203040506070Emerging Asia1970 75 80 85 90 95 2000020406080100Emerging Latin AmericaWhile relative manufacturing wages in emerging Asia are generally increasing,catch-up has been most evident in the newly industrializing economies, such asKorea, Singapore, and Hong Kong SAR. In contrast, Latin American economies havenot experienced much convergence.China Korea MalaysiaIndiaIndonesiaSingaporeHong Kong SARThailandBrazil ColombiaChile MexicoVenezuelaFigure 5.11. Information and CommunicationsTechnology (ICT) Capital, Patents, and Labor MarketIndicatorsUnited StatesOther Anglo-Saxon1 JapanEurope2The globalization of labor is but one of the forces that have influenced labormarkets in advanced economies over the past two decades. Rapid technologicalchange and changes in labor and product market policies are other significantdevelopments with potentially important implications for labor market outcomes.1982 87 92 97 200201234561982 87 92 97 20020123456 Employment ProtectionLegislation IndexProduct Market Regulation Index1985 90 95 20000204060801001201401601801980 85 90 95 20000123456 ICT Capital(percent of total capital)Number of Patents perWorking-Age Person 31982 87 92 97 200201020304050601982 87 92 97 20020102030405060 Average Replacement Ratefor Unemployment Benefits(percent of income)Tax Wedge(percent of labor cost)4Sources: Bassanini and Duval (2006); Jorgenson and Vu (2005); OECD, Science andTechnology Statistics; and IMF staff calculations.Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom.Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands,Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland. Greece is not included due to datalimitations.Patents that have been filed at the European Patent Office, Japanese Patent Office, andgranted by the United States Patent and Trademark Office (measured by priority year, thatis, year of first application).Difference between the labor cost to the employer and the net take-home pay of theemployee, in percent of the labor cost.1234Each channel of labor globalization (tradeprices, offshoring, and immigration) individuallyplays a relatively small role in explaining thedecline in the labor share.Labor globalization contributed to thedecline in labor shares in most countries, withbroadly similar effects in both Anglo-Saxoncountries and Europe.21 Nevertheless, the laborglobalization effect in the Anglo-Saxon countriesand Europe is driven by different factors.Europe’s labor share has been affected bothby offshoring and immigration, while, in theAnglo-Saxon countries, offshoring was a somewhatless important factor. Similarly, withinEurope, large economies were affected moreby immigration than by offshoring, while theopposite holds for small economies. Anothercomponent of globalization—the change intrade prices—generally had only a small neteffect on the labor share. Hence, while globalizationexerted downward pressure on the laborshare through declines in import prices, thiseffect has been broadly compensated by similardeclines in export prices, which have boostedthe labor share since exports of advancedeconomies are capital intensive. In large Europeancountries and Japan, the net effect fromchanges in trade prices was actually to boostthe labor share, likely reflecting a strongerconcentrationof exports in capital-intensivegoods.The reasons for the milder decline of thelabor share in the Anglo-Saxon countries thanin Europe are found in the role of technologicalchange and labor market policies rather than inthe differences in the impact of labor globalization.Technological change has contributed tothe reduction of the labor share in both groups,but less so in the Anglo-Saxon countries. Inparticular, in the United States, ICT capital evencontributed to raising the labor share, possiblyreflecting the fact that the United States is most21Some caution is needed when interpreting theseresults, since they are based on the regression coefficientsthat are the same for all the countries and averageannual changes in variables that are country specific.How Has the Globalization of Labor Affected Workers in Advanced Economies?173CHA PTER 5 The Globalization of Labor174-0.50 -0.25 0.00 0.25Europe largeFigure 5.12. Contributions to the Annual Change in Labor Share(Percentage points)1Labor globalization and technological progress have acted to reduce the labor share, with the impact of technological progress being somewhat larger,while changes in labor market policies have generally had a smaller but positive impact on the labor share. Trade prices, offshoring, and immigrationindividually play a relatively small role in explaining the decline in the labor share.Decomposing Changes in Labor Share Decomposing the Contribution of Labor GlobalizationSource: IMF staff calculations.1982–2002 or longest period available. 1986–2001 for Japan, as changes in the relative import price in earlier years reflected the yen's strong appreciation ratherthan globalization. The contributions are based on estimated regression coefficients and average annual changes in the respective variables by country (see Appendix5.1).The annual change in the labor share in this figure corresponds to the sample period for which all the regression variables were available and may thus differ fromthe one shown in Figure 5.7.Europe large includes France, Germany, Italy, and Spain.Europe small covers Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, and Sweden.Anglo-Saxon countries include Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United States.12345EuropeEurope smallAnglo-SaxonJapanAll advancedeconomiesEuropeJapanAll advancedeconomiesContribution of Technological ChangeEuropeJapanAll advancedeconomiesContribution of Labor GlobalizationEuropeJapanAll advancedeconomiesContribution of Labor Market PoliciesChange in the Labor Share-0.50 -0.25 0.00 0.25EuropeJapanAll advancedeconomiesEuropeJapanAll advancedeconomiesContribution of Trade PricesEuropeJapanAll advancedeconomiesContribution of OffshoringEuropeJapanAll advancedeconomiesContribution of ImmigrationContribution of Labor Globalization3452Europe largeEurope smallAnglo-Saxon345Europe largeEurope smallAnglo-Saxon345Europe largeEurope smallAnglo-Saxon345Europe largeEurope smallAnglo-Saxon345Europe largeEurope smallAnglo-Saxon345Europe largeEurope smallAnglo-Saxon345Europe largeEurope smallAnglo-Saxon345This box reviews the evidence on the effectsof emigration and trade on labor markets andincomes in developing countries.EmigrationWhile a vast theoretical and empirical literatureconsiders the impact of immigration on destinationcountries, little work has been done onemigration and its impact on source countries.This is surprising because the shares of the laborforce leaving many individual source countriesas emigrants are considerably higher than theproportionate changes in the labor force ofmany receiving countries due to immigration. Tocite a few examples, the labor force in Barbados,Belize, El Salvador, Guyana, and Jamaicahas been reduced by 20 percent or more due toemigration to the OECD countries. Meanwhile,immigrants constitute about 15 percent of theU.S. labor force, and the share is considerablylower in most other OECD countries.In general, source countries do not recordinformation on those who emigrate. However,Mexico and other Latin American countries—from where immigration is mostly to the UnitedStates—offer ideal case studies because U.S. datasources can be used to analyze the impact on thesource countries. Along these lines, Cardarelliand Ueda (2004) assess the impact of migrationto the United States on the welfare of sourcecountries. Using as a yardstick the incomeproduced by the nationals of the country irrespectiveof where they live, they estimate thatthe well-being of Mexican-born people was, onaverage, 20 percent higher than the country’sGDP alone would suggest over 1994–2003.Cardarelli and Ueda also conclude that immi-Note: The main author of this box is Prachi Mishra.See Borjas (1994 and 1995) for surveys of theempirical literature on immigration.The outflow of workers is largely to the UnitedStates, and took place between 1970 and 2000. In1965, the United States implemented the Immigrationand Nationality Act, which changed the basis of entryinto the United States from country quotas to familybasedreunification. This brought about a drasticchange in the composition of immigration, increasingthe share of migrants from developing countries.gration opportunities to the United States haveraised the well-being of nationals born in severalother developing countries, particularly in LatinAmerica and the Caribbean (e.g., Jamaica, Haiti,Nicaragua, and El Salvador) and in the Philippinesand Vietnam. One channel of incomegains for developing country residents, includedin these calculations, is the large flow of remittancesback into the country from emigrantsliving abroad (see the April 2005 World EconomicOutlook). While in Mexico annual remittanceswere about 3 percent of GDP over 1 990–2003,they amounted to over 10 percent of GDP in ElSalvador and Jamaica over the same period.Focusing on workers who have stayed home,Mishra (2007) examines the effect of emigrationto the United States on wages in Mexico,using data from the Mexican and U.S. censusesfor 1 970–2000. She finds a strong and positiveeffect of emigration on Mexican wages: a 10 percentdecrease in the number of Mexican workersin a given skill group (defined by schooling andexperience) increases the average wage in thatskill group by about 4 percent (Aydemir andBorjas, 2006, find a similar result). The impacton wages differs dramatically across schoolinggroups, with the greatest increase being for thehigher wage earners (those with 12–15 yearsof schooling) owing to the higher emigrationrate of this group. Hence, while all categoriesof workers who stay home benefit in terms ofhigher wages, emigration could serve as a partialexplanation for the increasing wage inequalityin Mexico.The positive effect of emigration on wages inMexico is confirmed by Hanson (forthcoming).He examines changes in the distribution oflabor income across regions of Mexico duringthe 1990s, a period of rapid globalizationof the Mexican economy. He finds that overthe decade, average hourly earnings in high-Emigration accounts for approximately 37 percentof the increase in relative wages of high school graduates(12 years of schooling) and 14 percent of theincrease in relative wages of those with some collegeeducation (13–15 years of schooling) between 1990and 2000.Box 5.1. E migration and Trade: How Do They Affect Developing Countries?How Has the Globalization of Labor Affected Workers in Advanced Economies?175CHA PTER 5 The Globalization of Labor176migrationstates rose by 6–9 percent relative tolow-migration states.While workers benefit from higher wages andfamilies from remittance inflows, capital ownerswho hire these workers lose. Overall, however,estimates suggest that there is a small aggregateannual welfare gain in the case of Mexico.Nevertheless, emigration can lead to loss ofwelfare if the fact that emigration of high-skilledworkers leads to a decline in the productivityof those who have stayed behind is takeninto account. For example, qualified doctors,researchers, and engineers confer a positiveexternality on the rest of the population, andthis is lost when they emigrate. Mishra (2006)estimates substantial productivity losses for thosewho stay behind because of the very high ratesof high-skilled emigration from the Caribbeancountries. Gupta, Pattillo, and Wagh (2007)also report a high rate of migration of skilledworkers from sub-Saharan African countries.One consequence of this is a human resourceshortage in the health sector of these countries,as skilled health care professionals get hired inthe high-demand OECD countries.TradeA large body of research shows that tradeopenness in developing countries has raisedaggregate incomes and growth rates (see Bergand Krueger, 2003, for a survey). Using crosscountryand panel regressions, many studieshave found that openness to trade is a significantexplanatory variable for the level or growthrate of real GDP per capita, with the weightof evidence suggesting that this result holdseven when the endogeneity of trade opennessis taken into account and after controlling forother important determinants, such as the qualityof institutions and geography.In contrast, the internal distributional consequencesof trade reform in developing countriesare still the subject of intense debate (see Goldbergand Pavcnik, forthcoming, for a survey).The workhorse model to analyze the labor marketconsequences of trade liberalization—theStolper-Samuelson theorem—predicts that tradeliberalization will shift income toward a country’sabundant factor. For developing countries,this suggests that liberalization will principallybenefit the abundant unskilled labor. Yet manydeveloping countries, including Argentina, Brazil,Colombia, China, India, and Mexico experienceda widening wage gap between skilled andunskilled labor during periods of trade reformduring the 1980s and 1990s.Of course, rising wage inequality does notnecessarily imply a causal impact of tradereforms (since typically trade reforms wereaccompanied by significant domestic reforms inmost countries). Hence, the literature in thepast decade has focused on trying to identifythe causal link between trade liberalization anddistributional outcomes. Two key methodologiesused are the industry-level and the regionalapproaches that examine whether industriesor regions that were more exposed to tradeliberalization experienced larger changes inlabor market outcomes. However, a drawback ofboth these approaches is that they can directlyDavis and Mishra (2007) discuss a variety of reasonsfor why the assumptions underlying the Stolper-Samuelson model may be too simplistic to hold in thereal world. One possible reason is that the patternof trade depends on a country’s “local” rather thanglobal factor abundance: a country’s factor abundanceneeds to be compared with that of others thatproduce the same set of goods. For example, Mexicois less skill abundant relative to the United States butmore skill abundant relative to China. When Mexicojoined the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade inthe mid-1980s, it opened its borders to the less-skill-abundant world, which could explain the risingwage inequality in the late 1980s.The definition of skill varies across specific countrystudies. Studies using household survey data defineskill based on education of the household head,whereas studies using plant- or firm-level data typicallydifferentiate between production and nonproduction,or blue-collar and white-collar, workers.Other explanations of the rising wage gaps includeskill-biased technological change or increased offshoringof activities that are relatively skill intensive fromthe point of view of developing countries (thoughoffshoring may itself be triggered by a free tradeagreement with an advanced economy, leading toreduced tariffs) (Feenstra, 2007).Box 5.1 (concluded)advanced in the use of ICT. The adverse labordemand effects of ICT appear to be strongerat the early stages of ICT adoption, before theneeded adjustments in workers’ education havetaken place.Changes in labor market policies have hada positive effect on the labor share in Anglo-Saxon countries, but a much more modesteffect on average in Europe, particularly inlarge European economies where labor policiesare estimated to have actually contributed to adecline in the labor share. The contribution oflabor market policies is driven primarily by thechanges in the tax wedge and unemploymentidentify only relative differences across regionsor industries and not identify the impact on thenation as a whole.The econometric evidence from differentcountries is mixed on how trade reforms affectrelative labor market outcomes across regionsor industries. Topalova (2005) and Edmonds,Pavcnik, and Topalova (2007) find that districtsin India that were more exposed to importliberalization experienced a slower reductionin poverty, which was coupled with lower investmentin human capital and a lower declinein child labor. On the other hand, using abroader measure of openness, Hanson (2007)finds that states in Mexico with high exposureto globalization (measured by the shares offoreign direct investment, imports, and exportsassembly in state GDP) experienced a rise inlabor incomes relative to low-exposure states inthe 1990s.The empirical evidence on the effect of tradeliberalization on wages at the industry level isPorto (2006) is one study that uses a generalequilibrium model of trade to answer the ambitiousquestion of the overall effect of trade liberalizationon inequality, in the context of Argentinean tradereforms. The model is used to simulate the effect oftrade policy changes on the distribution of householdwelfare (household expenditure per capita). He findsevidence of a pro-poor bias caused by the reform. Onaverage, poor households gained more from reformsthan did middle-income households. However, thedrawback of this approach is that predictions of themodel depend crucially on parameter estimates thatare typically not known (e.g., wage-price elasticities)and are difficult to estimate consistently with timeseriesdata on wages and prices when many otherpolicies changed along with trade (see Goldberg andPavcnik, forthcoming, for a discussion of this paper).also mixed. For example, studies find no significantrelationship between trade policy andindustry wages in Brazil and Mexico (Pavcnikand others, 2004; and Feliciano, 2001), whilethe reduction in tariffs within a sector is foundto be associated with a significant reduction inwages in that sector in Colombia (Goldbergand Pavcnik, 2005) but with an increase inwages in Poland (Goh and Javorcik, 2007). Theevidence from India on the effects of changesin tariffs on wages is mixed (see Topalova, 2005;Dutta, 2004; and Kumar and Mishra, forthcoming).Given that the sectors that experiencedthe largest tariff reductions were those withthe largest share of unskilled workers, theindustry-level studies thus suggest mixed effectsof trade liberalization on the overall wage gapbetween skilled and unskilled workers: tradereforms were associated with a higher wage gapin Colombia, possibly with an unchanged wagegap in Brazil and Mexico, and with lower wageinequality in Poland.In conclusion, on the one hand, emigrationand trade both increase the aggregate incomesof developing countries (once the income ofemigrants is included). On the other hand, theexisting evidence on the impact of globalizationon inequality is mixed, particularly in the caseof trade. Further research efforts are needed tofully understand these important issues.These studies use a two-step methodology. First,they use household survey data to estimate “industrywage premia,” defined as the part of worker wagesthat is explained by a worker’s industry affiliationafter controlling for observable worker characteristics(e.g., schooling, experience, and so on). Second,the estimated industry wage premia are regressed onmeasures of trade reform by industry.How Has the Globalization of Labor Affected Workers in Advanced Economies?177CHA PTER 5 The Globalization of Labor178benefit replacement.22 The decline in the taxwedge in Anglo-Saxon countries, especially inthe United States, benefited the labor share,while in Europe the labor share was hurt bya rise in unemployment benefit replacementrates.Turning to look at the skilled and unskilledsectors separately, the main factor affecting theincome share of labor in unskilled sectors overthe sample period, beyond the shift of employmenttoward skilled sectors, is technologicalchange (Figure 5.13). This result is consistentwith the belief that computers and other ICTequipment act as a substitute for unskilled labor,but they tend to complement skilled labor. Onthe other hand, labor globalization contributedto a decline in the income share of labor inskilled sectors, much more so than in unskilledsectors. This is in line with earlier findings thatthe increase in offshoring was mostly drivenby the offshoring of skilled inputs rather thanunskilled inputs. However, this was more thanoffset by the shift of employment from unskilledsectors to skilled sectors and the income shareof labor in skilled sectors actually increasedmoderately.23Of course, the effects on labor shares do notby themselves give the full picture of how workers’well-being is affected by forces of globalizationand technological change. These factorsalso influence output and total labor compensa-22The other variables, namely, employment protectionlegislation, product market regulation, and uniondensity, did not have significant effects. The analysis wasexpanded to investigate whether some labor market institutionstend to amplify or attenuate the impact of laborglobalization and technological progress. Although strictemployment protection legislation does not appear tohave any effect on its own, there is some evidence that ittends to increase the adverse effects of labor globalizationon labor shares. A more flexible labor market may thuscontribute to limiting the decline in the overall laborshare caused by globalization.23Workers in unskilled sectors have also benefitedsomewhat less from labor market policy changes.Although product market regulation has a negligibleimpact on the overall labor share, it seems to benefit theincome share of labor in unskilled sectors. Hence, thereduction in product market regulation over the sampleperiod had a negative effect on this income share.Labor in Skilled Sectors-0.4 -0.3 -0.2 -0.1 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3Change in the labor shareContribution of labor globalizatonContribution of technological changeContribution of labor market policiesContribution of employment shifts toskilled sectorsFigure 5.13. Advanced Economies: Contributions tothe Annual Change in the Labor Share by Skill Level(Percentage points)1Source: IMF staff calculations.1982–2002 or longest period available. 1986–2001 for Japan, as changes in therelative import price in earlier years reflected the yen's strong appreciation ratherthan globalization. The contributions are based on estimated regression coefficientsand average annual changes in the respective variables by country (see Appendix 5.1).1-0.4 -0.3 -0.2 -0.1 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3Change in the labor shareContribution of labor globalizatonContribution of technological changeContribution of labor market policiesContribution of employment shiftsaway from unskilled sectorsWhile technological change affected mostly the income share of labor inunskilled sectors, the labor income share in skilled sectors was moreaffected by labor globalization.Labor in Unskilled Sectorstion. The model results imply that on average,in advanced economies, the decline in tradedgoods prices yielded about a 6 percent increasein both output and total labor compensation, inreal terms, over 25 years.24 Thus, although thelabor share went down, globalization of laboras manifested in cheaper imports in advancedeconomies has increased the “size of the pie”to be shared among all citizens, resulting in anet gain in total workers’ compensation in realterms (Figure 5.14).25In sum, the econometric analysis suggeststhat both labor globalization and technologicalchange have been important factors behind theobserved decline in labor shares in advancedeconomies. The rapid progress in ICT has hada particularly strong effect on the unskilledsectors. The role of labor market policies hasdiffered across countries, with positive effectslargest in the United States and much moremodest on average in Europe (and negative insome countries). Finally, global competitionhas brought down international trade prices.Cheaper imports have increased the size of realtotal labor compensation, implying that workershave participated in the benefits of the biggereconomic “pie,” although their share of it hasdeclined.24This result was calculated as follows. The modelallows for deriving elasticities of labor compensationto trade prices: on average, a 1 percent declinein the relativeprice of imports raises real total laborcompensationby 0.5 percent, while a 1 percent declinein the relative price of exports lowers it by a somewhatsmaller 0.4 percent. Combining these elasticities withthe actual average changes in relative export and importprices implies an average annual increase in labor compensationof about 0.2 percent on average in advancedeconomies (or about 6 percent if compounded over 25years). The increase in output implied by the change intrade prices is just the difference between the percentchange of total labor compensation and the percentchange of the labor share (which is very small in thiscase).25It should also be noted that a comprehensive evaluationof the impact of globalization on workers’ financialmeans needs to go beyond labor compensation andto take into account an increase in direct and indirectasset ownership (see the September 2006 World EconomicOutlook).EuropeEurope largeEurope smallAnglo-SaxonJapan-0.1 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5Impact of Change in Trade Prices on Annual Change in Labor Share2Although on the whole the labor share went down, the globalization of laborincreases the size of the pie to be shared among all citizens, resulting in a net gainin workers’ compensation in most countries.34Figure 5.14. Effects of Changes in Trade Prices on LaborShare, Output, and Labor Compensation(Percent)1EuropeEurope largeEurope smallAnglo-SaxonJapan-0.1 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5Impact of Change in Trade Prices on Annual Change in Output234EuropeEurope largeEurope smallAnglo-SaxonJapan-0.1 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5Impact of Change in Trade Prices on Annual Change in Labor Compensation234Source: IMF staff calculations.1980–2004 or longest period available. 1986–2004 for Japan, as changesin the relative import price in earlier years reflected the yen’s strongappreciation rather than globalization. The effects are based on estimatedregression coefficients and average annual changes in the respectivevariables by country (see Appendix 5.1).Europe large includes France, Germany, Italy, and Spain.Europe small covers Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, theNetherlands, Norway, Portugal, and Sweden.Anglo-Saxon countries include Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom, andthe United States.1234All advancedeconomiesAll advancedeconomiesAll advancedeconomiesHow Has the Globalization of Labor Affected Workers in Advanced Economies?179CHA PTER 5 The Globalization of Labor180Summary and Policy ImplicationsThere has been a dramatic increase in the sizeof the effective global labor force over the pasttwo decades, with one measure suggesting it hasrisen fourfold. This expansion is expected tocontinue in the coming years. The UN projectsa 40 percent rise in the world’s working-agepopulation by 2050, and trade openness willcontinue to grow, especially in services. Indeed,tentative projections suggest that the effectiveglobal labor supply could more than doubleagain by 2050.26The global pool of labor can be accessedby advanced economies through imports andimmigration. Trade is the more important andfaster-expanding channel, in large part becauseimmigration remains very restricted in manycountries. Contrary to popular perceptions,the intensity of offshoring of the productionof intermediates is still small in the overalleconomy, although the manufacturing sector ismore affected because of its greater tradability.Imports of offshored intermediates have alsobeen growing somewhat more slowly than totaltrade.The integration of workers from emergingmarket and developing countries into the globalworkforce has produced important benefits foradvanced economies. Export opportunities haveexpanded considerably. It has provided accessto cheaper imported goods and has enabledcompanies to operate more efficiently. This hasboosted productivity and output, and contributedto rising real labor compensation. Foremerging market economies, the ongoing integrationof labor into the global marketplace hasbenefited workers, with manufacturing wagesrising rapidly.26This projection is based on the medium variant ofthe UN projections of working-age population and on theassumption that the ratio of non-oil exports to GDP willcontinue expanding at the rate observed in recent years(see Appendix 5.1). World Bank (2006) also provides projectionsof the world’s workforce until 2030 and projectsthat although the vast majority of the world’s workforcewill remain unskilled, the supply of skilled workers islikely to grow faster than that of unskilled workers.Nevertheless, labor globalization has negativelyaffected the share of income accruing to laborin the advanced economies (the labor share).It is, however, only one of several factors thathave affected the labor share over the past twodecades. Rapid technological change—especiallyin the information and communications sectors—has had a bigger impact, particularly on thelabor share in unskilled sectors. This is broadlyconsistent with findings highlighted in a recentjoint study by the International Labor Officeand the World Trade Organization (2007).Against this background, the increasing globalizationof labor and ongoing technologicalchanges raise important challenges for policymakersin the advanced economies. They mustseek to harness the benefits that the growingpool of global labor is creating. This meanscontinuing along the path of trade liberalization,while ensuring that domestic economiesare sufficiently flexible to be able to adjust andrespond to the pressures of globalization. At thesame time, it is important to be fully cognizantof adjustment costs, and policies do need to supportthose people who are negatively affectedby labor market globalization and technologicalchanges. In broad terms, policies need torespond along three dimensions:• Improve the functioning of labor markets. Steps toreduce tax wedges to enable workers to takehome a larger proportion of their gross payand to ensure that unemployment benefitreplacement rates do not deter workers fromseeking employment have helped a numberof countries adjust to the pressures of globalization.The duration of unemploymentbenefits and the work availability requirementsare also important (see Annett, 2006;and Bassanini and Duval, 2006). Moreover,policies that increase the flexibility of theeconomy and thereby enable workers to movemore easily from declining to expanding areasof the economy help the process of adjustment.A variety of country-specific approachesare possible, as demonstrated by the range ofexperience of successful reformers in westernEurope (see Box 2.2). Reform packages alsohave to be designed with fiscal consequencesin mind.• Improve access to education and training. Developingworkers’ skills is necessary for keepingup with rapid technological change andfor continuing innovation. Skilled sectorshave been better able to adapt to changingconditionscaused by the ICT revolutionthan unskilled sectors. Further, countriesthat started adopting ICT and trainingworkers in this area earlier experienced lessdecline in their labor share. Workers mustalso be ready to compete with the growingpool of skilled workers in emerging markets,especially those in Asia. Beyond increasesin spending on education and training, thequality of this spending is crucial. Experienceshows that evaluation and targetingof trainingare important to maximize itsimpact.• Ensure adequate social protection for workers duringthe adjustment period. This includes providingadequate income support to cushion,but not obstruct, the process of change,and also making health care less dependenton continued employment and increasingthe portability of pension benefits in somecountries. The latter would also enhancethe flexibility of the economy by facilitatingthe move of workers from declining sectorsto expanding sectors. Whether measuresspecifically targeted at workers who have beendisplaced by international trade are desirableis less clear (see, e.g., OECD, 2005). The factthat these workers may face special hurdlesreintegrating into the labor market as theyare often older and less educated, and theirskills are specific to declining industries oroccupations, argues in favor of such measures.Also, minimizing losses for such workers mayincrease support for the international economicintegration process. However, it may bedifficult (even conceptually) to differentiatebetween job losses caused by globalizationand those caused by other factors, since mostlabor markets are characterized by high ratesof turnover and year-to-year earnings variability.If trade-displaced workers are treatedmore generously, including, for instance, bybeing provided supplementary wage subsidies,such compensation should be structured toavoid dulling incentives to search actively fornew jobs.Appendix 5.1. Data Sources and MethodsThe main authors of this appendix are FlorenceJaumotteand Irina Tytell.Variable Definitions and Data SourcesThis section provides further details on theconstruction of the variables used in this chapterand the sources of the data.Sectoral ClassificationThroughout the chapter, the analysis is carriedout both for the aggregate economy andfor a disaggregation of the economy by skillcategory. The classification of trade and laborinto skill categories is based on the skill intensityof the sector. Hence skilled exports are exportsof goods and services typically produced by skillintensivesectors. The skilled labor share is theshare of national income that accrues to workersin skill-intensive sectors. One drawback of thisapproach is that it does not capture changesthat occur between skilled and unskilled workerswithin sectors. A more refined approach was,however, not feasible because of the lack ofcross-country data on the wages of production(unskilled) and nonproduction(skilled) workers,which would have been needed to calculatelabor shares and labor compensation of skilledand unskilled workers.The classification of sectors into skilled andunskilled is based on the share of skilled workersin the labor force of the sector, where a personis considered skilled if he or she has at leastupper secondary education. Data on the averagefraction of skilled labor in each sector (across 16OECD economies from 1994 to 1998) are fromJean and Nicoletti (2002). The chapter classifies18 sectors (from the International StandardAppendix 5.1. Data Sources and Methods181CHA PTER 5 The Globalization of Labor182Industrial Classification, Revision 3) into twobroad aggregates, namely, unskilled and skilledsectors, as reported in Table 5.1. In order totest the robustness of the results, an alternativethree-category split was also used, whichdistinguishes between low-skill, medium-skill,and high-skill sectors. Figure 5.15 shows thatthe patterns of the labor shares (and real laborcompensation per worker and employment) forthe narrower high- and low-skilled aggregatesare similar to those for the broader skilled andunskilled aggregates.Labor Compensation and Labor SharesLabor compensation was calculated byaugmentingthe compensation of employeesfor the income of other categories of workers(self-employed, employers, and family workers).Following Gollin (2002) and for dataavailabilityreasons, it was assumed that othercategories of workers earn the same averagewage as employees. Labor compensation ishence the product of the compensation ofemployees and the ratio of total employmentTable 5.1. Classification of Sectors by Skill IntensityMain Classification Alternative ClassificationUnskilled Low skilledAgriculture AgricultureMining MiningFood and tobacco Food and tobaccoTextiles, apparel, and leather Textiles, apparel, and leatherWood WoodOther nonmetal products Other nonmetal productsMetals and metal products Metals and metal productsTransport equipment ConstructionOther manufacturingConstruction Medium skilledTrade, hotels, and restaurants Paper and publishingTransport equipmentSkilled Other manufacturingPaper and publishing UtilitiesFuel, chemicals, and rubber Trade, hotels, and restaurantsMachinery and equipment Transport and communicationsUtilitiesTransport and communications High skilledBusiness services Fuel, chemicals, and rubberSocial and personal services Machinery and equipmentBusiness servicesSocial and personal servicesSources: OECD; and IMF staff estimates.Figure 5.15. Advanced Economies' Labor Income Share,Labor Compensation, and Employment: Robustness toAlternative Skill ClassificationIncome Share of Labor(weighted; percent of GDP)1980 85 90 95 2000010203040501980 85 90 95 200001020304050High skilledLow skilledSkilledUnskilledReal Labor Compensation per Worker(weighted; index, 1980 = 100)1980 85 90 95 2000801001201401601980 85 90 95 200080100120140160SkilledUnskilledHigh skilledLow skilledEmployment(weighted; index, 1980 = 100)1980 85 90 95 2000801001201401601980 85 90 95 200080100120140160High skilledLow skilledSkilledUnskilledSources: Haver Analytics; International Labor Organization, Labor Statistics Database;OECD, Employment and Labour Market Statistics, National Accounts Statistics, and STANIndustrial Database; United Nations, National Accounts Statistics (2004); and IMF staffcalculations.For the analysis by skill level, advanced economies include Austria, Belgium, Canada,Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, the UnitedKingdom, and the United States; weighted using series on GDP in U.S. dollars from theWorld Economic Outlook database.11and employees.27 Other correction procedures(see Gollin, 2002, for a review), for which thedata are not widely available, yield similar patternsover the subset of the sample used in thischapter for which the data are available. Thiscorrection was applied at both the aggregateand the sectoral level of data. When sectoraldata on employees or total employment werenot available, the following procedure was used:• the ratio of total employment to total employeeswas assumed to be the same as in previousyears or, if it was not available for any year, itwas assumed to be equal to the average forthis sector across other OECD economies; and• the sum of “nonemployee” workers acrosssectors was constrained to add up to the totalfor the aggregate economy by scaling theimputed number of nonemployee workersproportionately.The variables are defined as follows. Reallabor compensation is labor compensationdeflated by the CPI index from the WorldEconomic Outlook database. The labor shareis calculated as the ratio of labor compensationand value added at basic prices.28 The share oflabor in skilled (unskilled) sectors is the ratio oflabor compensation in skilled (unskilled) sectorsto the economy-wide value added.The main data source is the OECD’s StructuralAnalysis (STAN) Database. However,several other sources were used to fill in missingdata and extend the series to the most recentyear possible. For employees’ compensation andvalue added, these include the OECD’s NationalAccounts Statistics, the UN’s National AccountsStatistics, and Haver Analytics (for Japan). Fordata on total employment and employees, theadditional sources were the OECD’s Employmentand Labor Market Statistics Database andthe ILO Labor Statistics Database. Due to data27Korea was excluded from the sample because someof the income of the self-employed is already in theemployees’ compensation, making it impossible to applythe correction (see also Young, 1995 and 2003).28The exceptions are Japan, where value added is measuredat producer prices, and the United States, where itis measured at market prices.availability reasons, the calculations were limitedto advanced OECD economies.Manufacturing WagesManufacturing wages for advanced and developingeconomies are from the UNIDO IndustrialStatistics Database. They were convertedinto constant purchasing power parity (PPP)dollars using CPI indices and PPP exchangerates from the World Economic Outlook database.The data for China are from the CEIC Asiadatabase.ImmigrationThe data on foreign labor force are from theOECD’s Trends in International Migration (2003edition for all countries except the UnitedStates). For the United States, the data are fromthe U.S. Census Bureau and the U.S. Bureauof Labor Statistics. Data for Italy, the Netherlands,Norway, and the United Kingdom arefor foreign employment instead of labor force.Data for Australia, Canada, and the UnitedStates refer to foreign-born labor force insteadof foreign labor force. The available series wereextended backward using growth rates from thestock of foreign (or foreign-born, in the caseof Australia, Canada, and the United States)population when available, and the missing yearswere interpolated.Data on emigration for 1990 and 2000 arefrom Docquier and Marfouk (2005) and refer tothe stock of emigrants to the OECD economies.Trade and OffshoringData on trade used in the chapter are from avariety of sources. Aggregate data on trade quantitiesand prices are from the World EconomicOutlook database, including for the non-oilgoods and services aggregates. Sectoral tradedata for advanced economies (used to constructskilled and unskilled trade) are from the OECDSTAN Industrial Database (for manufacturing)and from the OECD International Trade inServices Database (for services). For developingcountries, sectoral trade data were obtainedfrom the World Integrated Trade Solution (forAppendix 5.1. Data Sources and Methods183CHA PTER 5 The Globalization of Labor184manufacturing) and from the IMF’s Balance ofPayments Statistics (for services). Data on manufacturingtrade of advanced OECD economies bysource country are from the OECD STAN BilateralTrade Database. The services data for Indiawere extended using the CEIC Asia database.Offshore outsourcing is the outsourcingof intermediate production to companies inlocations outside the country, which can beforeign affiliates or independent companies.It is measured by the imports of intermediateinputs, as provided in the OECD Input-OutputTables (1995, 2002, and 2006 editions). Thesetables assume that an industry uses an importof a particular product in proportion to its totaluse of that product (“the import proportionalityassumption”), and this proportion is theeconomy-wide share of imports in domesticdemand. The measure used in the chapter onlyincludes nonfuel manufacturing and servicesinputs. Imported intermediate inputs of a sectorare scaled by either the sector’s gross output orits total use of intermediates. Sectoral offshoringintensities are then aggregated based on sectoralgross output weights. Finally, the data on theoverall offshoring intensity are interpolated formissing years.For years beyond 2000, the OECD data wereextended using the latest input-output tableavailable (2000 for most countries) and updatingthe data on the import proportions for eachcategory of intermediate input. The latter wasapproximated by the share of imports in domesticabsorption (consumption and investment)for that category of products (sector). Data onimports by sectors are from the OECD STANIndustrial Database for manufacturing and fromthe OECD International Trade in Services Databasefor services. Data on value added by sector(used to calculate absorption) are from a combinationof the OECD STAN Industrial Databaseand the Groningen 60-Industry Database.2929Sectoral offshoring intensities were aggregated usingsectoral value-added weights, due to the lack of data onsectoral gross output for the later years. The historicaland extended series were then spliced using growth rates.Imports of final goods and services are constructedas a residual by subtracting importedintermediate inputs from total imports.Global Labor SupplySeveral measures of the global labor supplyare calculated, including the world’s workingagepopulation, the world’s labor force, and anexport-weighted world’s labor force. The latterattempts to measure the presence of the countries’labor supply in the international marketand is calculated as the sum across countriesof national labor forces, each weighted by thecountry’s ratio of non-oil exports to GDP (Harriganand Balaban, 1999). The export-to-GDPratio is capped to one to limit the weight ofcountries specialized in re-export trade. Dataon working-age population and labor forceare from various sources, including the WorldEconomic Outlook, the World Bank’s WorldDevelopment Indicators, the United NationsPopulation Projections, and the CEIC Asia databases.The global labor supply by education levelis calculated using the Barro-Lee (2000) dataset on educational attainment of the populationaged 15 or more. It is assumed that the share ofthe labor force with higher education is aboutthe same as the share of the population aged 15or more with higher education. For the years2001–05, this share was extrapolated linearly foreach country.The projections of the global labor supplyfor 2006–50 are based on the UN projectionsof the working-age population. The labor forceparticipation rate in each country is assumed toconverge by 2050 to the current rate of laborforce participation in the United States. Assuminginstead that labor force participation ratesremain at their current levels does not havemuch effect on the global labor supply projections.Projections for the export-to-GDP ratioare based on country-specific World EconomicOutlook projections until 2012, and on the trendincrease observed in the world export-to-GDPratio for later years. Under these assumptions,the cumulative growth in the export-weightedglobal labor force over 2005–50 could rangefrom a low of 120 percent (under the low variantof the population projections) to a high of190 percent (under the high variant).Capital Stock and ICT CapitalFajnzylber and Lederman (1999) are thesource of the capital stock series for the entireeconomy. This data set extends the capital stockseries estimated by Nehru and Dhareshwar(1993) by adding the annual flow of gross fixedcapital formation and assuming a 4 percentdepreciation rate to the preexisting stock ofcapital.Jorgenson and Vu (2005) provide series onIT investment using national expenditure datafor computer hardware, software, and telecommunicationsequipment. A perpetual inventorymethod applies varying depreciation rates toestimate IT capital stock. This method assumesa geometric depreciation rate of 31.5 percentand a service life of 7 years for computer hardware,31.5 percent and 5 years for software, and11 percent and 11 years for telecommunicationsequipment.Labor Market Policy IndicatorsThe indicators of labor and product marketpolicies were provided by Bassanini and Duval(2006). The indicators are defined as follows:• Average unemployment benefit replacementrate is the average of the unemploymentbenefit replacement rates corresponding tomultiple income, family, and unemploymentduration situations. These include two incomesituations (100 percent and 67 percent ofthe average production worker earnings),three family situations (single, with dependentspouse, with spouse in work), and threeunemployment durations (1st year, 2nd and3rd years, and 4th and 5th years of unemployment).The original data are from theOECD’s Benefits and Wages Database.• Labor tax wedge is the difference betweenthe labor cost to the employer and thecorrespondingnet take-home pay of theemployee for a single-earner couple withtwo children earning 100 percent of theaverage production worker earnings. It isthus the sum of personal income tax and allsocial security contributions expressed as apercentageof the total labor cost. The originaldata are from the OECD Taxing WagesDatabase.• Employment protection legislation is theOECD summary indicator of the stringencyof Employment Protection Legislation. Theoriginal data are from the OECD EmploymentOutlook (2004).• Product market regulation is the OECD summaryindicator of regulatory impedimentsto product market competition in sevennonmanufacturing industries (gas, electricity,post, telecom, passenger air transport, railwayspassenger and freight services, and roadfreight). The original data are from Conwayand others (2006).• Union density measures the share of workersaffiliated with a trade union. The originaldata are from the OECD Employment Outlook(2004).Econometric ApproachThis section presents the model used to examinethe relationship between globalization andlabor shares and reports the results from theestimations.MethodologyThe econometric approach used in thischapter is based on a model used frequently inthe trade literature (see Feenstra, 2004; Harrigan,1998; and Kohli, 1991). The model uses arevenue function with fixed factor quantities (oflabor and capital) and exogenous product prices(of exports, imports, and domestic absorption).It assumes that firms are maximizing profits, allmarkets are competitive, and factors can movefreely between firms. The revenue function islinearly homogeneous and concave in factorquantities and convex in product prices. It istypically specified as a flexible translogarithmic,or translog, form (Christensen, Jorgenson, andLau, 1975).Appendix 5.1. Data Sources and Methods185CHA PTER 5 The Globalization of Labor186Using the translog revenue function, productand factor shares can be obtained asS i = – p–i–yi– = ai + Σaij lnpj + Σgij lnvj + ΣϕijzjGR i = –w–i–v–i = bi + Σgij lnpj + Σbij lnvj + Σφijzj ,Gwhere S are product shares, R are factor shares,p are product prices, v are factor quantities, andz are shift variables. The shift variables captureany factors that could be expected to shift therevenue function, for example, measures oftechnological progress or offshoring, as suggestedby Feenstra (2004). The share equationsare subject to a number of cross-equation restrictionsthat follow from symmetry and linearhomogeneity of the corresponding revenuefunction.Given the theme of this chapter, the estimationsfocused primarily on the labor share equations.The following equation was adopted asthe basic specification for the analysis:pE pM LRL = bL + gELln––– + gMLln––– + bLLln–––pA pA K+ φ LM KICT KICT LXX + φLM ––– + φLC –––– + φLC2(––––)2+ eL,L K Kwhere PE, PM, and PA are prices of exports,imports, and absorption; L is labor; K is capital;X is offshoring; LM is immigrant employment;and KICT is ICT capital. The relative prices andquantities are used to impose the necessaryhomogeneity restrictions. Labor shares are correctedfor the income of other (nonemployee)categories of workers, prices and the capitalstock variables are measured in 2000 U.S. dollars,and labor stock variables are representedby employment. Offshoring is measured as ashare of imported intermediate inputs in totalintermediate inputs, immigration is capturedas a share of immigrant employment in totaldomestic employment, and ICT capital ismodeled as a share of ICT capital in the totalcapital stock (more detail on these measurementsis provided above). The effect of ICTcapital is represented by a quadratic functionto reflect potential nonlinearities associatedwith the need for learning the new technology:the adverse effect on wages and employmentis likely to be greatest before workers acquirethe skills necessary to effectively handle thenew equipment. The model was estimated ona panel of 18 countries over 1982–2002 usingcountry fixed effects. The basic specificationwas extended to include several measures oflabor market policies, including the tax wedge,the replacement rate of unemployment benefits,indices of product market regulation,employment protection legislation, and uniondensity.30A potential concern with the accuracy ofthe estimation is that the variables related tolabor globalization—trade prices, offshoring,and immigration—may be endogenous. Tradeprices are unlikely to be exogenous for countrieswhose economic size is sufficiently large.31Reverse causality or common third factors maybias the effects of offshoring and immigrationon the labor share. To address this concern, aninstrumental variables estimation was used withvariables reflecting domestic and foreign supplyand demand conditions, as well as lags of thepotentially endogenous variables as instruments.Specifically, the list of instruments included theshare of government consumption in GDP; theconsumption tax rate; the (log of) total population;the (log of) export-weighted real GDP oftrading partners; the distance-weighted exportadjustedemployment in the rest of the world (ameasure of the global labor supply); and lags of(logs of) relative trade prices, offshoring, andimmigration.In addition to the aggregate labor shareequation, a system of labor share equations forskilled and unskilled workers was also estimatedas follows:30A specification including interaction terms betweenthese policy variables and measures of labor globalizationand technological progress was also explored.31The price of absorption could also be affected bychanges in the labor share, which reflect changes in unitlabor costs.pk LRS = b k S +k=Σ E,MgkS ln––– +k=Σ S,UbSk ln––– + φSXXpA K+ φ LM KICT KICT SM ––– + φSC –––– + φSC2(––––)2+ eL K K SR U = b pk Lk U +k=Σ E,MgkU ln––– +k=Σ S,UbkU ln––– + φUXXpA K+ φ LM KICT KICT UM ––– + φUC –––– + φUC(––––)2+ eU,L K Kwhere S and U denote skilled and unskilled,respectively, and the other variables are thesame as above. A symmetry restriction postulatesthat the coefficients on the (log of)labor-capital ratio of the unskilled in the firstequation and the skilled in the second equationare the same. This system was augmented toinclude country fixed effects and the measuresof labor market policies, and was estimatedby iterated three-stage least squares using theinstruments listed above.Estimation ResultsThe estimation results from the aggregatelabor share equation are shown in Table 5.2.Most of the variables are statistically significantand have expected signs:• Higher relative export prices and lower relativeimport prices are associated with thelower labor share. This is consistent withadvanced economies’ exports being relativelycapital intensive and their imports, whichincreasingly come from developing countries,being relatively labor intensive.• Offshoring and immigration are negativelyrelated to the labor share, consistent with therising global labor supply exerting a negativeeffect on domestic labor demand. The coefficientson these variables in the instrumentalvariables regression are somewhat larger inabsolute value, suggesting the presence ofreverse causality: a lower labor share, whichreflects lower unit labor costs, makes offshoringless appealing for domestic firms andmakes immigration less attractive for foreignworkers.• Technological progress appears to have a nonlineareffect on the labor share, consistent withthe idea that labor-saving innovations initiallycreate the need for extra learning on the partof workers, but enhance their productivitylater on as the necessary skills are acquired.• Among the policy variables, only higher taxwedges and unemployment benefit replacementrates are associated with a lower laborshare, reflecting labor market rigiditiesstemmingfrom these policies.32 A nonlinearspecification including interaction terms withlabor globalization and technological progressvariables suggested, in addition, that employmentprotection legislation tends to increasethe effects of these variables on the laborshare.32Other labor and product market variables, specifically,the index of employment protection legislation, theindex of product market regulation, and the union densitymeasure, were not statistically significant and were,therefore, excluded from the final specification.Table 5.2. I mpact of Labor Globalization andTechnological Change on Labor SharesFixed EffectsEstimation(excluding Fixed InstrumentalDependent Variable: labor market Effects VariablesLabor Share policies) Estimation EstimationRelative export price (log of) –0.117*** –0.113*** –0.165***Relative import price (log of) 0.076** 0.087*** 0.138***Labor-capital ratio (log of) 0.055** 0.015 –0.025Offshoring –0.196* –0.156* –0.285***Immigration –0.627*** –0.553*** –0.746***ICT capital –2.871*** –2.643*** –3.517***ICT capital squared 56.407*** 44.962*** 55.598***Tax wedge . . . –0.002* –0.002***Unemployment benefits . . . –0.001*** –0.001***Fixed effects Yes Yes YesObservations 231 225 208R-squared 0.61 0.62Anderson test . . . . . . 151.63***Hansen test . . . . . . 6.61Source: IMF staff calculations.Note: * denotes statistical significance at the 10 percent level; **denotes statistical significance at the 5 percent level; and *** denotesstatistical significance at the 1 percent level. Standard errors areheteroscedasticity and autocorrelation robust. ICT = information andcommunications technology.Appendix 5.1. Data Sources and Methods187CHA PTER 5 The Globalization of Labor188The findings are generally robust to theexclusion of outliers (identified in terms oftheir influence on predicted values and thevariance-covariance matrix of the estimates) andof individual countries.33 They are also robustto splitting the import price into that of oiland non-oil imports (while the oil price has astatistically significant effect on the labor share,it is small in magnitude). The coefficients onthe ICT capital stock, its square, and offshoringbecome statistically insignificant when timeeffects are included. This is not surprising sincetime effects are often used in empirical studiesto capture the effect of worldwide technologicalprogress and other broad global trends. Thetime effects show a declining pattern over time,consistent with the negative effect of the growth33Partial correlation plots, showing the correlationbetween the labor share and each regressor after controllingfor the other explanatory variables, confirm that theestimated relationships are quite robust.in the ICT capital stock and offshoring on thelabor share. The coefficients on the share of ICTcapital are more robust to the inclusion of timeeffects when measured as a share of investment,rather than of capital stock. Similarly, the coefficienton offshoring of skilled inputs is morerobust to the inclusion of time effects than thaton total offshoring.The estimation results from the labor shareequations for skilled and unskilled sectorsare shown in Table 5.3. The first two columnscontain independent fixed effects estimationsof the two equations, the middle two columnspresent independent instrumental variablesestimations, and the last two columns showthe system estimation with the cross-equationrestriction imposed. Labor globalization andtechnological progress appear to have somewhatdifferent effects on the labor shares ofworkers in skilled and unskilled sectors. Laborglobalization has a somewhat stronger effecton the skilled sectors, in line, for example,Table 5.3. I mpact of Labor Globalization and Technological Change on Skilled and Unskilled Labor SharesInstrumental Three-Stage___F_ix_e_d_ _E_ff_e_c_ts_ _E_s_ti_m_a_t_io_n_ __ ____V_a_r_ia_b_l_e_s_ E_s_t_im__a_ti_o_n_ ___ ___L_e_a_s_t_ S_q_u_a_r_e_ E_s_t_im__a_ti_o_n___Skilled labor Unskilled Skilled labor Unskilled Skilled labor UnskilledDependent Variable share labor share share labor share share labor shareLog of:Relative export price –0.072*** –0.049*** –0.117*** –0.060*** –0.115*** –0.058***Relative import price 0.053*** 0.031** 0.089*** 0.041*** 0.097*** 0.044***Skilled labor-capital ratio 0.093** –0.203*** 0.075** –0.210*** 0.156*** –0.163***Unskilled labor-capital ratio –0.089*** 0.181*** –0.098*** 0.177*** –0.163*** 0.143***Offshoring –0.134* –0.016 –0.203*** –0.052 –0.191*** –0.043Immigration –0.507*** –0.162** –0.678*** –0.225** –0.663*** –0.216***ICT capital –0.808 –0.922* –1.413* –1.099** –2.046*** –1.409***ICT capital squared 22.358* 10.458 29.792*** 13.346* 38.688*** 17.860***Tax wedge –0.001 –0.001** –0.002*** –0.001*** –0.002*** –0.001***Unemployment benefits –0.001** –0.000* –0.001*** –0.000** –0.001*** –0.000***Product market regulation 0.000 0.002 0.001 0.002** 0.000 0.002**Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes YesObservations 219 219 202 202 202 202R-squared 0.53 0.94 . . . . . . . . . . . .Anderson test . . . . . . 140.83*** 140.83*** . . . . . .Hansen test . . . . . . 7.7 8.4 . . . . . .Source: IMF staff calculations.Note: * denotes statistical significance at the 10 percent level; ** denotes statistical significance at the 5 percent level; and *** denotes statisticalsignificance at the 1 percent level. Standard errors are heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation robust. ICT = information and communicationstechnology.with more offshoring occurring in the skilledsectors. Technological change affects both skillgroups negatively, but the effect is less strongfor the skilled, consistent with the nonlinearitydue to learning requirements, as suggestedabove. These results should be treated assomewhat more tentative, however, given thatthe classification by skill is based on broad economicsectors.The contributions of the various factors to thechange in the labor shares shown in the maintext are calculated as the average annual changein the respective variable multiplied by the correspondingcoefficient estimate. The averagesacross country groups are weighted by the numberof years of data available for each country,so that countries with more data receive a largerweight in these averages. These contributionsallow introducing cross-country differences inthe role of various factors, although they do notfully reflect cross-country heterogeneity, sincethe estimated coefficients are the same for allcountries in the sample.Elasticity CalculationsThe econometric model used in this chapterallows going beyond the effects of various factorson the labor share by computing the elasticitiesof labor compensation per worker and employmentto these factors (Kohli, 1991).The elasticities of labor compensation perworker to trade prices (given employment) areobtained as follows:e ( W , p i) = – g–iL– + Si ,RLwhere i = E, M, and the output shares RL and Siare evaluated at the mean for each country.The employment elasticities with respect totrade prices (given labor compensation perworker) are obtained as follows:e(W,pi)e(L,pi) = – ––––––,e(W,L)bwhere e(W,L) = ––LL– + RL – 1 and i = E, M.RLCombining these elasticities gives the elasticityof the total labor compensation to trade prices:e(WL,pi) = e(W,pi) + e(L,pi),where i = E, M. It is important to point out thatthese elasticities are derived from the modelthat assumes fixed prices, hence possible priceadjustments are not taken into account in thesecalculations.34To compute the actual percent changes in thetotal labor compensation resulting from changesin trade prices, these elasticities are multipliedby the average percent changes in relative tradeprices in each country. The averages acrosscountry groups are weighted by the number ofyears of data available for each country, so thatcountries with more data receive a larger weightin these averages. 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